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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLL INDICATES LARGE GAINS FOR GREENS, SETBACK FOR LEFT

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 28 Apr 86 p 8

/Text/ A public opinion survey carried out by M-Tietokeskus predicts gains for the Greens in the parliamentary elections. They register an increase from 1.5 to nearly 7 percent. Loss of voters were, primarily, registered by the People's Democrats and the Rural Party. Even the Social Democrats have lost voter support but their party still remains the largest. The poll was sponsored by the newspaper KALEVA in Uleaborg and indicated a decrease in support for leftist parties from 40.7 to 36.2 percent, while the nonsocialist block increased from just below 60 percent to 63.8 percent. The poll was taken at the end of February and beginning of March.

The poll shows that both the People's Democrats and the Social Democrats will lose 2 percent of the voters. The People's Democrats get 12.1 percent of the vote, compared to 14 percent in the parliamentary elections 1983. The Social Democrats are supported by 24.1 percent compared to 26.7 in the last elections.

The support for the Centre Party has increased from 16.6 to 18.2 percent and that for the Coalition Party from 22.1 to 23 percent.

To the Rural Party it looks like the Green Party will advance from 1.5 percent to 6.9 percent. The rest of the changes are only marginal.

The public opinion institute also measured party loyalty by comparing the votes of those interviewed with how they voted in the last local election in 1984 and how they intend to vote in the next parliamentary election. It appears that the Rural Party loses votes to all other parties, above all to the Social Democrats, whereas some of the People's Democrats' supporters will vote for the Social Democrats or the Greens. The voters of the National Coalition /Conservative/ Party are the most loyal and 94 percent of them will remain faithful to their party.

The poll also shows that 88 percent of the voters in the People's Democratic League will vote for a member of their party in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

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CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONGRESS AIRS TERRORISM

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 27 Apr 86 p 9

[Article by Marit Ingves: "Ehrnrooth: 'Resolutions Do Not Control Terrorism'"]

[Text] "We, as well as the majority of the French, ought to understand that terrorism cannot be controlled by resolutions, nor by economic sanctions," Georg C. Ehrnrooth, the Constitutional Conservative Party chairman maintained in his political overview during the seventh Party Congress in Helsinki.

Ehrnrooth felt that the President of the United States could not continue to sit with his arms crossed waiting for still another terrorist attack, which would have cost the lives of more Americans.

"The American attack was contrary to international law," he said, "but it is also against the law--although often excused--to exaggerate the self-defense the one who is attacked resorts to."

Ehrnrooth also, without naming names, attacked Christoffer Taxell, the minister of justice. He considered it "outrageous that the country's minister of justice" can stand up and warn that the fight against terrorism can hurt a state governed by law.

"Something entirely different ought to be expected from justice minister than a speech that could encourage the terrorists and the political dictators who are behind them and who instruct and finance them."

Ehrnrooth also gave a boot to the [Conservative] Coalition Party in his overview. After the American retaliation attack, the leaders of the Coalition party condemned the action. But their statement did not mention one word about the terrorist actions carried out by the Libyan leader.

"Everyone, who is interested in Finland's future as a Nordic Western state, should ask himself where we will end up if we, in our country, do not have a Conservative party "with a spine but only parties vying for the favors of a Socialist superpower," said Ehrnrooth.

"Everyone, who is interested in Finland's future as a Nordic Western state, should ask himself where we will end up if we, in our country, do not have a Conservative party "with a spine but only parties vying for the favors of a Socialist superpower," said Ehrnrooth.

Furthermore, he accused the Finnish parties of maintaining a low profile in questions concerning human rights. He wondered if a conservative party in Finland could, "without losing its soul," remain silent about human rights violations, when they occur in countries that are close to us.

"Not until now, at least in speeches, have those questions begun to have the status in foreign policy that they ought to have in a civilized country. But translating words into deeds is still far off.

"We, the Constitutional Conservatives, emphasize the credibility of a neutrality policy, which requires consistency," said Ehrnrooth.

He was of the opinion that our foreign policy credibility will be harmed if Finland joins the group of countries that demand that all ties with South Africa be severed, while refraining from voting on Afghanistan in the UN.

At this point in his speech, Ehrnrooth was met with loud applause. The applause became louder later in the day, when two representatives of the freedom movement in Afghanistan honored the Congress with their presence.

"With God's help and your support and that of the rest of the world, we will expel the socialist imperialists from our country," the freedom fighters promised and the audience gave them the support they were seeking.

"We do not see the President of the United States as a threat to world peace. On the contrary, we have noticed that there have been more serious negotiations between the superpowers during his term as president. The new Soviet leader, of course, has contributed his share," said the party chairman.

In the domestic policy part of his overview, Ehrnrooth also touched on the presidential election. According to him, each and everyone's thoughts about the election are, even today, their own business. "We are not in a position to take a stand, either as the first party or at an early stage--not even after Paavo Vayrynen is chosen as the candidate of the Center Party."

Ehrnrooth also scrutinized his own party and thought that, in spite of the fact that the question, on the basis of which the Constitutional Conservative Party was founded, has not been of interest for many years, the party still has great objectives, for which the current modest personnel and other resources are not sufficient.

"If the Constitutional Conservative Party disappeared, the void in politics not least in the debate that is part of a democratically functioning society, would be greater than if one of our many parties were joined with another."

The central theme of the general policy debate at the seventh Party Congress in Helsinki was the future of the party.

The younger delegates, in particular, were discussing the need for a party that more and more resembles "a modern Western Conservative party." The Constitutional Conservative Party ought to be a party that is "classically liberal and constitutes an alternative to collective thought"--a freedom alternative.

During the debate, the audience of about 100 people was also encouraged to engage more actively in working for the party. It was said that we need vote-getters.

Nils Meder also wanted to explain the Soviet desire for peace by the fact that the country can no longer expand its influence and by the fact that the Soviet Union can only maintain its present position in peacetime.

He insisted on talking about Russia, even after his party members pointed out to him that the name of the country is the Soviet Union--a word that according to him is a "monster." He also let the audience know that always talks about Petersburg.

The elections were unanimous during the Congress. Georg C. Ehrnrooth continues as party chairman. Panu Toivonen remains as party secretary. However, a "rejuvenation operation" was performed on the two vice-chairman positions.

The chairman for the Helsinki district, Markku Pietikainen, became first vice-chairman, Tuula Heiman became the second.

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PAPER COMMENTS ON CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR 'CATASTROPHE'

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 30 Apr 86 p 2

/Editorial by Rafael Paro: "The Catastrophe in the Ukraine"; a reminder to people in densely populated Europe that the risks of nuclear power cut across all national borders. Such catastrophes point to the tremendous needs for cooperation and exchange of information in order to avoid similar disasters in the future/

/Text/ Wherever there is a nuclear power plant in this world there is now also an enormous need to find out what caused the accident at the Soviet nuclear power plant in Chernobyl. The Soviet authorities would provide a service to the entire world if they put their cards on the table, considering the fact that experiences in this field are hard to come by--both in regard to human lives and property values.

It is a fact that the Soviet Union, in many ways, has been a leading country with respect to nuclear power. It was the Soviet Union which really became serious about the mass production of nuclear power stations for civilian use in the 1960's. The expansion of nuclear power stations was not even a subject for debate for a couple of decades. It is only recently that there has been an increase in remarks of critical nature. Many of these have been generated by biologists in regard to the problems caused in water by the release of large amounts of cooling water.

The Soviet nuclear power program has probably suffered a number of serious setbacks in the course of the years. There are a number of reports in the West about Soviet reactor accidents. One of them refer; to statements made by the minister of energy, at that time, Pjotr Neporosjnyj, who is supposed to have confided to the American Congressman Robert Michel--in connection with the Harrisburg accident in the United States 1979--that there had been several accidents in Soviet power plants, including an explosion accident and one involving radiation leakage.

It is not in line with Soviet style to give out information to the world at large about such problems. Not even Soviet citizens themselves were given any more detailed information about what had occurred.

People who are part of the culture which regards freedom of information as a golden rule always find it difficult to comprehend the rationale and objective reasons for withholding relevant information from the citizenry.

It is difficult to understand why, apparently, several days went by before Soviet citizens were notified on TV through a short TASS report. It stated that a reactor had been damaged in an accident at Chernobyl and that measures had been taken to "eliminate the consequences of the accident" and that those "affected" had received treatment.

There is an enormous difference in the reactions of how the Soviet authorities acted and how the Swedish authorities came to decide that it was necessary to evacuate the nuclear power station in Forsmark when there, initially, was no way of discovering the reasons for the high level of radiation.

It is difficult to know what kind of consequences the Chernobyl accident will have on the Soviet nuclear program as long as the extent of it remains unknown. The new 5-year plan and the long-range program up to the year 2000 assumes that half of the energy needs at the end of the century will be met by nuclear power production. A certain amount of worry can, however, be read between the lines, in regard to safety questions. The program states that "there must be guarantees for continued improvement in the construction of energy units."

Even though traditional Soviet reticence continues to manifest itself during the last couple of days there are also signs of new thinking. This is particularly reflected in the agreement signed by the Soviet Union in February last year with the International Atomic Energy Commission IAEA in regard to inspections of Soviet power stations. Radio Moscow stated at that time that the Soviet Union will open up more power stations to international inspection. There are some 40 nuclear power stations in the Soviet Union which are intended for civilian use and several are in the process of being built.

The original intent of these inspections was to prevent the use of atomic energy produced for peaceful purposes to be used for military purposes. This system of inspection is one of the mainstays in the international agreement against proliferation of nuclear weapons which was signed by 120 nations in 1970.

It is easy to arrive at some premature conclusions in regard to the future of nuclear power, especially, while there are no relevant facts from the Chernobyl accident. Everyone has been aware that this technology demands that great safety needs be met. The determined opponents to nuclear power in our country, for example, have helped to raise the consciousness on the part of the decision-makers for the need of making high demands on the builders of nuclear power stations.

Today many ask themselves if nuclear power has received the death blow in the world because of the accident in Ukraine. Certainly there will be many who review their attitude toward nuclear power. One can also expect that the accident will lead to a higher level of activity on energy markets in the world at this time. It would not be surprising if "safe" alternatives like oil and coal were to register increases in price.

The only way that nuclear power would come to an end, once and for all, Chernobyl would have to reveal, fundamentally, new knowledge that--not even in theory--is it possible to control the technology on which nuclear power is based.

If, on the other hand, it is clear that only sins of omission or negligence are involved, it is uncertain that countries lacking economically viable alternatives would be deterred by the accident.

Nevertheless, densely populated Europe has been reminded of the fact that the risks of nuclear power cut across national borders. The radioactive fallout has spread across several nations. The need for cooperation and exchange of information is alarmingly great if catastrophes of this kind are to be avoided in the future.

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NATIONAL FRONT ADAPTATION TO POLITICAL CHANGE EXAMINED

Paris INTERVENTION in French Jan-Mar 86 pp 25-32

[Article by Guy Birenbaum: "National Front: Changes in a Splinter Group"]

[Text] Beginning as a surprising competitor at the time of the 1984 European elections, the National Front, since that astonishing appearance on the political scene, has changed noticeably.

This splinter group of yesterday, stimulated by its own successes in the elections and in the media, has become a political party adapted to the demands of French political life. It has learned how to "become an institution," changing from a political group which was "out of the running" into a group which is "in the political game."¹

However, this process of change did not take place in the course of a single election. In effect, as we look back at them, we can now interpret the elections of June 1984 correctly and thus understand to what extent the emergence of the National Front represents a coincidence of views between an organization and the electorate, through the operation of an election system suitable to it and in a particular political and social context.

First of all, the implementation of the proportional representation system has had an influence on voter habits.² Proportional representation changes the breakdown of the vote,³ making it possible for small parties, such as the National Front, to be represented. Furthermore, when the electoral issues are perceived as having limited importance and voters do not have strong reasons for voting, the consequent lack of interest among the voters⁴ may give rise to surprising results.

A Deceptive Election

On the other hand, the system of electoral lists,⁵ the differences of view and the problems which this system brought out within the RPR-UDF opposition played a decisive role in lending strength to the anti "establishment" position of the National Front, strengthening its denunciations of the way the political system functioned and the political actors on the scene.

Finally, the seizure of the immigration issue by Jean-Marie Le Pen's party made it possible to mobilize a substantial number of voters.⁶

Therefore, the vote for the National Front was more than a real protest vote. We find here an election characterized by "freeing voters of their complexes." This tendency was⁸ amplified by a number of circumstances favorable to the National Front, offering it an unexpected but deceptive springboard.

It was deceptive because, paradoxically, the 10.95 percent of the vote obtained in the European elections of 1984 was neither the reflection of a well-developed strategy nor was it an index of a committed, partisan "reality." The electoral potential reflected, therefore, was beyond the reach of an organization which had neither the structure nor the means to achieve this result, nor did the party try to attract so many votes.¹⁰ The "party of Jean-Marie Le Pen" had not even become the "National Front."¹⁰ The European elections gave birth to a party which did not even know itself. It remained for this group to give itself "a kind of existence,"¹¹ confirming its new status. The National Front had to adjust itself to its electoral potential. This requirement led it to reach beyond itself, adjusting its means of adapting itself to the circumstances of the political struggle and field.

To achieve this objective, real procedures, imposed on the party by its political leadership, were going to have an impact on the changes within the organization. The electoral schedule made this unavoidable. Thus, the cantonal elections of 1985 and the legislative elections of 1986 were going to lead the party to provide itself with a structure, to place a favorable gloss both on its statements as well as on its image, and to diversify itself.

A Truly National Front

As Jean-Marie Le Pen admitted on the evening of the European elections: "Everything starts from today." This admission contained the nucleus of the future evolution of his organization. This largely Parisian splinter group had to become a party with a structure at the national level. In effect, just 9 months before the 1985 cantonal elections the National Front was totally unadapted to the local "terrain."

Therefore, J.-P. Stirbois¹² had the task of establishing a real party structure at all of these artificial levels.

--First, the leadership bodies of the National Front, including the congress,¹³ the national council, the central committee, and the political bureau, evolved from having a completely symbolic kind of existence to having a relatively functional status. However, real political power within the party remained the sole prerogative of an oligarchical political bureau¹⁴ and even a limited¹⁵ core of its members, when it was not in the hands of Jean-Marie Le Pen alone.

--The local levels of the party were then taken in hand by the party machine in Paris. In fact, a kind of Parisian style national cohesion was developed, adapting the organization to the existing electoral structure of the party, which was considered anarchical and ineffective in the framework of a political struggle of national scope.¹⁶ For there were already in existence independent political structures at the departmental level, at times divided into skeleton-like party sections. In most cases their leaders had proclaimed

themselves local leaders of the National Front. These "embryo" party units were marking time, without any resources at their disposal and beyond the control of the party leadership.

However, the overall confusion was supposed to be set in order by the establishment of party sections and departmental organizations (in Paris and in the immediately surrounding area) by party members or sympathizers who were "recognized" by party headquarters on the Rue de Bernouilli.¹⁷ The party as a whole was to be set up on a federal basis, following the model of the most effective departmental units and particularly the federation in the Department of Val-de-Marne, under the leadership of J.-P. Schenardi.

On the basis of the organizational model which emerged and by providing support for the most effective local organizers, J.-P. Stirbois adapted the party to the needs of the political campaign. Thus, at every level of the national administrative system there was a party structure (a section for the cantons and communes, a federation for the departments, and assemblies for the various regions of the country). These structures had a leader¹⁸ (the secretary of a section or department and a regional secretary) responsible for his particular organization.¹⁹

This strictly vertical structure was to ensure the adaptation of the party to the political scene. However, later on it also provided evidence of the support and allegiance of local party levels to Paris headquarters.

--Thus, deprived of any powers of decision in terms of the local orientation of the National Front,²⁰ the secretaries of party sections only had authority regarding the administrative organization of their offices.²¹ Furthermore, they saw themselves as restricted to performing a single role, which gave them authority "politically" but to a negligible extent. They were responsible for the recruitment of new party members. For the rest, they were largely "under the influence" of higher party levels. The "Stirbois system" placed them under the supervision of the departmental secretary and prohibited any form of "horizontal" cooperation between party sections.

At the same time, by placing the departmental secretaries under the regional secretaries party headquarters in Paris controlled its troops even more closely. The more so, as these regional secretaries themselves were directly under J.-P. Stirbois!

Therefore, and at all echelons of the National Front, any challenges to the leaders were avoided, and simple discussions or debates on the "official line" were neutralized, through this skillful use of "nearby" controls on the party. Party discipline made this necessary!

However, the submission of these local figures of the National Front to Paris headquarters was made more bearable by the new interest shown by the political bureau of the party in nominations and electoral candidacies.

--Nominations to new positions in the party and appointments to electoral lists are real powers which lead to continuing competition within the National Front. Party cadres, placed in competitive positions by these possible promotions, devote themselves to their duties "with increasing energy"²² and

are promoted through "efficiency reports" sent to a sovereign political bureau, which evaluates their efforts as party members, the number of new members in their section, or their length of service in the party. As a secretary of a Paris section explained it to us, "the sole criteria the hierarchy of the National Front uses with us are: the results of the elections and the number of our members. In the political bureau the various candidates for office are considered on the basis of these criteria." Therefore, in this context the allocation by the political bureau of various positions and responsibilities is subject to these criteria of internal effectiveness and the ability to "perform."

Although there is no doubt that the situation was seen in this way by many local party officials, this is because this myth of promotion based on merit was widely believed among party leaders. However, in reality this single type of criterion was not decisive by itself--far from it.

--In effect, we saw a process of change in the National Front: the system of designating party leaders, previously based on merit and on seniority in the party, was going to change.

The new electoral constraints led the political bureau to set down new rules of operation, largely based on a distinction between partisan and electoral functions.²³ The development and changes in recruitment were to become vital imperatives.

The National Front is going to appoint and place responsibilities on a new category of actors who are more specialized, more competent, and more "presentable."

This internal "revolution," which was justified by the process of preparing the organization for the cantonal elections, created a certain amount of trouble among the oldest members of the National Front.²⁴

However, this process of change was to turn out to be effective.

After successfully nominating 1,521 candidates²⁵ (for three-quarters of the cantons where elections were being held), the National Front obtained 8.8 percent of the vote. Even though this was below its vote in the European elections, the result was not negligible. After carrying out a careful reorganization of the party the National Front succeeded in keeping the voters whom it had won over by surprise. It had been able to develop a "faithful" electorate of about 10 percent of the total vote.

--Moreover, this group of voters appears to have a specific point of view (as Pascal Perrineau has shown²⁶ (on the basis of the poll taken among voters on 10 March 1985²⁷)).

The fact remains that the concentration of Jean-Marie Le Pen's party on this group of voters was not simply made possible by its organizational adaptation to the rules of political competition. A "major job of work" was done in terms of speeches and the image of the National Front.

Making the National Front Look Presentable in a 'Controlled Way'

Initially, the National Front "functioned" on the basis of a single strategy, that is, the total emphasis given to a point of view latently held in society as a whole. In effect, it was by investing in beliefs or aspirations, without any fear of violating taboos, that the National Front broke the routine of the established political discourse. It did this, in particular, on themes which were social realities to a high degree (immigration and insecurity). Therefore, by playing on prejudices, even though irrational, it strengthened them politically, forcing their inclusion--or their reinclusion--in the political agenda.

Was this demagoguery? Jean-Marie Le Pen never hid it. He said: "My ideas are the same as yours"; "I say out loud what the French people think among themselves";²⁸ and, "Politics consists of translating the aspirations of the people in forms which are governmentally possible."²⁹ In the event the National Front surged into a space not occupied by any other political party.

Therefore, parodying the view expressed by G. Miller on the Petainist slogan, "Travail-Famille-Patrie" [Work, Family, Fatherland] ("Vichy did not³⁰ invent this slogan but breathed it in from the air around it at the time,"³⁰), we might state that the National Front did not "invent" its political position but rather "received" it and then strengthened it by "saying it out loud," in the words of an old song.

However, the fact remains that, as P. Bourdieu notes, "the access" (of a party) to political realities "depends" on its "strengthening," that is, on "broadening the base of its supporters," even at the price of entering into political schemes and making concessions or even engaging in methodically jamming everything which is too exclusive in the original positions adopted by the party."³¹

By orienting itself toward this kind of political realism,³² The National Front strengthened its organizational structure with a strategy of euphemization, with the objective of "clearing" itself of its negative aspects. It strengthened its "low grade" populism with improved language and (correspondingly) an improved image.

--However, before the European elections this strategy was the "exclusive concern" of Jean-Marie Le Pen. As the only figure authorized to speak in the name of the National Front, he monopolized this innovative role and drew from it all possible benefits. (See his first appearance on "Heure de Verite" [French TV interview show].) However, as they implied a complete local orientation, the cantonal elections made it necessary to hold meetings in all four corners of the country. Jean-Marie Le Pen could no longer make all of the political speeches by himself, nor could he personally support all of his candidates. Having to give up his monopoly on making speeches, he delegated this responsibility, on condition that other speakers reproduce faithfully a political speech couched in euphemistic terms. The National Front³³ had to appear as a responsible party. Certainly, it was anti-communist,³³ but it was devoted to the law, was democratic and liberal, and above all supported an economic form of ultra-liberalism which closely followed President Reagan. Above all, it was neither racist nor anti-semitic but simply vigilant in the

face of the rising wave of "anti-French racism" (sic) and concerned about restoring to French citizens "national preference." Finally, he certainly wanted "to reverse the flow of immigration" but under "conditions of human dignity."³⁴ Regarding party leaders, it was imperative that they show themselves to be professional politicians, representing themselves as "occasionally involved in politics"³⁵ and having been successful in their respective occupations. This stance as non-professional politicians³⁶ fit in perfectly with the deprecating and anti-political language used by the National Front, while ideally meeting the expectations of public opinion, for which the image of politicians as a class is negative.³⁷ Hence, National Front leaders would emphasize their competence as technicians and as shareholders, appearing (as much as possible!) as models of entrepreneurial success³⁸ and with a respectability not open to attack. In short, they would "not be men of the Right but be extremely right-thinking."³⁹

This kind of talk, dictated and endorsed by the party leadership, was to be taken up and spread around.

--Therefore, the emancipation of the National Front concerned its principal leaders (members of the political bureau and members of the European Parliament). The latter, often denounced for their appearance or their past, as much as for their excesses, were "requested" to submit themselves to this new "requirement to appear reserved," which was appropriate to national leaders of a political party which wanted to be seen as respectable. The uncontrolled verbal excesses were to disappear, as R. Holeindre explained to us:⁴⁰ "In the National Front, you shut your mouth. You have a leader and you follow him!"

The fact remains that the strategy of improving the party image, in order to be politically worthwhile, should not be limited to the top levels of the party. Cadres and members of the National Front have also been called on to appear moderate, to be reassuring at their own level, on the ground.

Therefore, in order to make the whole party speak the same kind of decorous language, the headquarters of the National Front set up a restrictive, internal kind of ideological discipline. A kind of real, vital, euphemistic and "official" language was adopted, to be applicable both to party cadres and ordinary members. Different leadership styles aimed at educating the lower levels of the party were used. For example, about 15 committees with various responsibilities were set up under B. Collnish, a university professor.⁴¹ Initially, they were assigned the task of preparing speech outlines intended in particular for party candidates in the cantonal elections.⁴² In addition to providing "easily understandable" ideological "ammunition," this material clearly set the tone and outlined the behavior which candidates were required to adopt, from the very beginning.

The outline stated: "This document has the sole objective of helping the leaders, candidates, and members of the National Front to answer some objections or questions which are very frequently asked by observers of good faith who, without being hostile to us, still have some reservations regarding us. These reservations, even without their knowing it, are often the result of the disinformation efforts going on in the areas where they live. Attacking them brusquely when they have been subjected to misinformation by

the media could simply annoy them, as it is so true that no one wants to be considered a person who is easily influenced. Therefore, all of the members of the National Front are invited to join in a long persuasive effort with the public."

The undeniable, formal moderation of this document is further strengthened in terms of substance by the tone of the answers suggested to the candidates. For example, in response to the question, "So, would you like to throw the immigrants into the sea?" the candidates are advised to reply, "We are opposed to the policy of immigration but not to the immigrants as such." In a different area, the question is asked: "I am a civil servant. Now, Jean-Marie Le Pen often attacks civil servants. What can I expect from the National Front?" The outline recommends remarking, "Jean-Marie Le Pen is denouncing a general situation. In his mind this does not mean that there are no conscientious civil servants."

Beyond this kind of outline which is directly aimed at electoral situations, the Gollnish committees are preparing more timely outlines which set out the exact party position on major subjects of interest in order to avoid "interpretations" by the members which are too extreme in tone.⁴³

In the same way the committees were charged with drafting the doctrine and the program of the National Front. In these documents excesses in language were avoided, and unexpected values appeared (assistance to others, cooperation, solidarity, and liberty)⁴⁴ which are in notable contrast to the traditional doctrines of "work-family-fatherland." Furthermore, whereas in previous programs published by the National Front references were made to "defending", "asserting," and "reestablishing,"⁴⁵ the program now finds it sufficient to refer to "investing," "assuring," and "building."⁴⁶

Finally, university seminars and other study programs provide in the last analysis for the training of party members and officials. Their programs of training and then the respect for the toned down language of party pronouncements are evidence of the change in the National Front.

However, this process of change is not yet complete. In the context of the forthcoming legislative elections of March 1986 further diversification around several themes will be added to the reorganization and toning down of the party's statements undertaken in the period prior to the cantonal elections.

The Year of All the Compromises

The legislative elections of 1986 and the kind of election system that will be used for them are presenting the National Front with an "historic" opportunity: the probable representation in Parliament of the Extreme Right. This is a still unusual scenario under the Fifth Republic. This elections campaign has further deepened the changes going on within the party, changing its label even more clearly and turning it into a kind of National Rally.

The "spearhead of the national opposition"⁴⁷ will henceforth see itself as "the locomotive of a rally of various Right wing groups, social and professional elements, and independents."⁴⁸ The party is opening itself up and broadening its base by diversifying its range. This movement to the

center is arousing a certain amount of gnashing of teeth (so far limited) as much involving the most conservative groups, which are returning to their originally small splinter groups, as certain local leaders who are disappointed⁴⁹ at seeing people from other parts of France "parachuted in" to replace them.

--On the ground the process of change is beginning with a request for contributions from the association "Modern Enterprise and Freedom," which was established in 1985. Although this organization is officially autonomous, it is directed by European deputies from the National Front. Recruiting its members in business circles, among skilled workers, and among business proprietors, it calls on "all leaders of private enterprise to join in the reestablishment of free enterprise." Several levels of groups (covering various professions and sectoral and geographic organizations) function around "Modern Enterprise and Freedom." In reality, they are developing for the National Front a new network of groups which are really voices for the expression of its ideas. Added to this structure is another center made up of members of the liberal professions. The members of all of these groups are called on to support party activity and to expand the impact of the National Front in the professional circles in which they move. A committee has been set up to identify the most dynamic and most representative individuals in these groups. These individuals will then become active antennas for the party in their companies, organizations, and even orders or bar groups. Under this heading we note recent recruits to the party, including P. Descaves, former vice president of the SNPMI; P. Forestier, formerly the secretary general of the CID-UNATI; Doctor Bachelot, former delegate general of the Chamber of Liberal Professions; and finally A. Arette-Landresse, former president of the French Federation of Agriculture. Moreover, since 1985 the National Front has been sending people like these a bimonthly "Letter from Jean-Marie Le Pen," which is an integral part of the "charm offensive" aimed at this important group "of hidden voters."⁵⁰

Beyond these social and professional groups, other circles are being organized (women, veterans, serving military personnel, etc) and are being included in this structure which has the objective of making the best use for the National Assembly of those points of access among voters groups considered most likely to support its ideas and then to join its ranks.

--More directly political is the impact of the membership in the party of a certain number of persons active in politics and in Right wing opposition groups. Thus, the Comites d'action republicaines [Republican Action Committees] have joined the party, and B. Megret, its president, has been placed at the head of the National Front list in the Department of Isere. Similarly, J.-Y. Le Gallou, former secretary general and chief thinker of the Club de l'horloge, is second on the list headed by J.-P. Stirbois in the Department of Hauts-de-Seine. The Rassemblement pour les libertes [Rally for Freedom] is also represented in the party by H. Lavenir, its president. On the other hand, the negotiations undertaken with the CNI [National Center of Independents] of Ph. Malaud broke down in the middle of "the Demarquet affair." However, certain members of the CNI, dissatisfied that their party did not join in the National Rally, instead joined the National Front, breaking with their leader. These include M. de Rostolan, national secretary of the CNI, who is on the list of the National Rally. Other such people have

joined, including a certain number of local leaders of the RPR who were better "remunerated"⁵¹ (in terms of positions or places on candidates' lists) by the party of Jean-Marie Le Pen than by the party of Jacques Chirac.

All of these recently-joined figures--active in social and professional or political groups--are therefore real evidence of the diversification of the party, both in terms of its supporters as well as in terms of its potential.

However, this process of diversification, which is aimed at providing the National Front with the image of a less exclusive and more constructive organization,⁵² involves major "slowdowns" in the preparations for the legislative elections. It is true that an additional straphanger in the National Assembly is well worth a few compromises!

Changes in the organizational structure, toning down the stridency of its statements and, at the same time, its image, and, finally, the diversification of its membership are three strategies which play a role in the changes in the National Front, facilitating its adaptation to the political arena.

However, these efforts should not distract us too much.

Originally a splinter group of the Extreme Right,⁵³ the National Front, even if it has become a political party, remains an organization of the Extreme Right. Several indications provide evidence of this.

--Most of the oldest leaders of the party⁵⁴ followed the "royal path," the traditional "obstacle course" of every self-respecting French Right wing extremist! Although few of them were associated with Vichy,⁵⁵ it was the wars in Indochina and Algeria,⁵⁶ support for the UDCA led by Pierre Poujade, participation in the committees led by Tixier-Vignancourt,⁵⁷ and the muscular opposition to the riots and demonstrations of May 1968⁵⁷ which constituted the principal stages in their political commitment. This commitment found⁵⁸ a conclusion which, after all, was quite logical in the timely establishment of the National Front. The National Front was the inevitable objective for those who were going to miss their targets in any case. This shortcut may seem hastily prepared or a suitable subject for caricature. However, it faithfully summarizes the path followed by a number of National Front leaders (even though some of them⁵⁹ cut corners or joined rather lately). Jean-Marie Le Pen is the "ideal type"⁵⁹ of member and then leader of the Extreme Right.

--This active past under the standards of conservative activism presupposes support for and the defense of specific values. Thus, although in the "pantheon" of leaders of the National Front the nation has an important place, the slogan of "work-family-fatherland" (in this order or in another order) is the real credo. Regarding order and morality, they all share a common respect for the Catholic faith, which they often practice in its most traditional form.⁶⁰

--In addition to these well-marked values, we may find in the themes which the leaders of the National Front have "excavated" from the past the heritage of the French Extreme Right. From xenophobia to virulent anti-communism, involving also rampant anti-parliamentary views, the National Front follows an (extreme!) Right wing view. Furthermore, the denunciation of those who are

"against France," as well as the theme of a "plot" (more recently led by Islamic and Marxist elements), are part of the same tradition. This tradition is symbolized by fidelity to Joan of Arc, the perpetual myth of French nationalism.

-- Finally, its statements and the incitation to the exclusion of "the other" makes the National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen a natural and spiritual heir of the "founding fathers" of French Right wing extremism.

Then isn't it striking to note that the National Front, on the eve of the legislative elections of March 1986, is generally conceded 10 percent of the vote, although the changes described above have not completely effaced its extremist features, which only yesterday were considered illegitimate and reasons for rejecting or excluding it from the political field?

A review of the past leads us to the conclusion that we are in the presence of one of the perverse effects of the alternation of political parties in power. The brusque reversal of the balance of political forces in 1981 had the consequent effect of liberating the Extreme Right of the French political field from a kind of reflex of criticism, progressively opening the way for its joining a party, a providential outlet for all this discontent: the National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen.

Therefore, the consolidation of the National Front depends as much on the balance of forces between the Left and the "classical" Right as on its ability to manage the new, strategic imperatives of its presence in the National Assembly.

FOOTNOTES

1. In the same sense, on the institutionalization of political groups, see Charlot, J. and M., "Les groupes politiques dans leur environnement" [Political Groups in Their Environment], in Grawitz, M., and Leca, J. (editor), "Traite de science politique" [Treatise on Political Science], published by PUF, 1985, Volume 3, pp 429-485.
2. As Matonti, F., notes, the natural effect of the proportional representation system "is to accentuate the representation of small parties by allowing the voter to avoid having his decision on how he will vote affected by the need to cast a useful vote in particular." See "L'extreme droite en France depuis 1981" [The Extreme Right in France Since 1981], a memorandum of the DEA [Department of Applied Economics], Paris I, 1984, p 62.
3. "Proportional representation replaces the binary logic of majority voting with a multipolar logic which profoundly affects electoral behavior," in Habib, L., "A la recherche de la cinquieme Republique" [In Search of the Fifth Republic], RPP No 919, September-October 1985, p 93.
4. Some 43 percent of the registered voters did not take part in the election.

5. As Matonti, F., notes, the system of electoral lists had "the effect of accentuating the attraction of a potential voter for the list of the National Front," op cit, p 62.
6. Some 64 percent of the voters for the National Front state that they voted "in order to speak in favor of reducing the number of immigrants in France." See "Les motivations de vote aux elections europeennes en faveur de la liste du Front national" [Voter Motivations in the European Elections in Favor of the National Front List], SOFRES, "L'opinion publique 1985" [Public Opinion in 1985], Paris, Gallimard, Table 4, p 181.
7. This is a classical phenomenon during off-year elections of minor importance.
8. We should add here the television appearance of Jean-Marie Le Pen on the "Heure de la Verite" [The Moment of Truth] (1984).
9. The only "tactic" of the National Front consisted of bringing forward personalities of all kinds who were respectable and legitimate. This tactic had the objective of reversing the extremist image of the party and of Le Pen's entourage.
10. Commentaries made at the time reported on the Le Pen "shock," the Le Pen "breakthrough," or even the Le Pen "effect." Rarely or never did they refer to a success by the National Front.
11. Charlot, J. and M., op cit, p 435.
12. The "administrative" organization of the party is really a prerogative delegated by Jean-Marie Le Pen to his "ultimate successor."
13. For more information on the organizational structure of the party and its manner of operation, see Birenbaum, G., "Les strategies du Front national: participation au champ politique et demarquage" [The Strategies of the National Front: Participation in the Political Arena and Borrowings from Other Groups], memorandum of the DEA, Paris I, 1985.
14. In effect, this bureau, which operates without sharing its powers over the party, replaces its members by cooptation, even though the party statutes provide for its election by the central committee. In fact, it is made up of a core of members present at the same time in the two cases where it designated (from among its own membership) the fortunate ones to be "elected."
15. At times the leader of the National Front makes decisions without consulting his subordinates. Thus, two members of the political bureau told us that the decision to withdraw candidates from the second round of the 1985 cantonal elections was made by Le Pen alone.
16. Jean-Marie Le Pen received 0.74 percent of the votes cast in the presidential elections of 1974; in 1981 he did not succeed in getting the 500 signatures necessary for his candidacy, nor to field more than 77 candidates in the legislative elections of that year.

17. The Paris headquarters of the party.
18. Above the party sections are the party sectors which include them.
19. Appointed by the responsible leader at the next highest level.
20. All political campaigns are orchestrated and controlled from Paris.
21. Moreover, and this is another form of Paris "domination," the bureaus of all local sections of the National Front are organized on the model of the political bureau of the party.
22. Within the party there are real, permanent "working class kingpins." They are party sympathizers. The National Front stimulates their "productivity" by repaying them in a largely honorary way. In effect, the slightest new responsibility, however limited or contingent on others, is sought after to the extent that it is perceived as a form of repayment.
23. As J.-P. Schenardi (a regional secretary) explained it to us: "Performing the duties of a party section leader does not necessarily lead to nomination as a candidate in case of an election. A local leader is not necessarily the best candidate. It is necessary for local leaders on the ground, who fight the battle, to be different from the political leaders."
24. As a result, there are certain tensions within the party.
25. According to internal figures within the National Front, three-quarters of the candidates were running for the first time in an election.
26. See his article in the same issue.
27. Poll by Bull-BVA on the basis of a sample of 4,350 voters.
28. These are examples of typical Le Pen slogans.
29. Views expressed by the leader of the National Front at the time of his first appearance on "The Moment of Truth."
30. Miller, G., "Les pousse-au-jouir du Marechal Petain" [The Pleasure Motives of Marshal Petain], Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1975, pp 109-110.
31. Bourdieu, P., "La representation politique" [Political Representation], "Actes de la recherche en Sciences sociales" [Social Science Research Proceedings], No 36-37, February-March 1981, p 13.
32. Ibid, p 13.
33. J.-P. Schenardi told us: "I am an anticommunist, first, second, viscerally, and any way you want it!"
34. All citations taken in the first place from Jean-Marie Le Pen are subsequently repeated in unison by all of the party leaders.

35. As Weber uses the term. See Weber, M., "Le savant et le politique" [The Scholar and the Politician], Plon, Paris, 1959, p 109.
36. The lack of professional political skills was the hallmark of National Assembly deputies who supported Pierre Poujade. The fact remains that they were really more lacking in political skills than are the leaders of the National Front, in fact. On this point see Birenbaum, G., op cit.
37. According to the poll carried out from 22 to 29 August 1984 by LE MONDE on "The Image of Politicians," 62 percent of the French people considered that politicians do not deal with the main subjects which concern the life of the French people. Some 82 percent believe that politicians do not tell the truth.
38. The example here, once again and always, is Jean-Marie Le Pen, whose professional experience as an editor is considered within the party the very incarnation of social success.
39. This is also an expression by Jean-Marie Le Pen, which has been included in the conversation of all of the party leaders.
40. A member of the political bureau, charged with the organization of Le Pen's public meetings.
41. The young dean of the University of Lyon.
42. The text of the outline was later printed in NATIONAL-HEBDO, the party journal (and then sold by news agents), in order to "familiarize" all party sympathizers with the official line.
43. For example, an outline may be devoted to the "right to vote for the immigrants."
44. "Un avenir d'espoir pour la France" [A Future of Hope for France], a pamphlet published by the party in 1985.
45. 1983 party program.
46. "A Future of Hope for France," op cit.
47. This is the name which the party gave itself in the 1983 version of its program.
48. Views expressed by Jean-Marie Le Pen to the first party Summer University Session (in September 1985 in Pau).
49. The most dissatisfied have gone so far as preparing dissident lists to make things difficult for the official list of the National Front.
50. That is how J.-M. Le Chevalier, a deputy in the European Parliament and the real right hand man of Le Pen, describes this publication.

51. One of the strengths of the National Front is knowing how to dangle tempting responsibilities before "disappointed" members of the RPR (and this is done at all levels of the party!).
52. The program of the National Front has recently come out in a popular edition (for the first time).
53. At the time it was established in 1972 the National Front for French Unity was the "electoral machine," the respectable antenna of "Ordre nouveau" [New Order], which was dissolved on 28 June 1973.
54. At the moment these figures are still numerous within the political bureau.
55. Only R. Gaucher (a member of the political bureau) was sentenced to 3 years in prison after the liberation in 1945 for having been active in the "Jeunesses populaires" [People's Youth] of Marcel Deat.
56. Having fought for a French Algeria is a constant theme among the leaders of the National Front. Some of them have even defended illegal actions, such as R. Holeindre, sentenced to 3 years in prison for having belonged to the OAS [Secret Army Organization].
57. In splinter groups like "Occident," which were properly dissolved shortly after the events of May 1968.
58. As explained by P. Durand (a member of the political bureau) and one of the most faithful among Le Pen's supporters, "After the Tixier Committees, there was a long period when we had no particular political movement, and we all looked forward to the establishment of the National Front."
59. May Max Weber pardon us for this distortion of his concept!
60. R. Marie, a deputy in the European Parliament, brought together around the party a nebulous group of traditionalist associations, such as the Committees of Christianity and Solidarity or the General Alliance Against Racism and for the Respect of French and Christian Identity.

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FUTURE POTENTIAL OF NATIONAL FRONT VIEWED

Paris INTERVENTION in French Jan-Mar 86 pp 33-41

[Article by Pascal Perrineau]

[Text] The National Front seems to have settled down in French political life. The polls give it 8 to 9 percent of announced intentions to vote in the legislative elections of March 1986. The French electorate gave it 8.8 percent of their votes in the cantonal elections of March 1985 and nearly 11 percent at the time of the European elections on 17 June 1984. Jean-Marie Le Pen fills the television screens and the air waves. Nearly one-quarter of the French people agree with the ideas which he supports.¹ Although the party which he leads has less of an impact than he does, it is no less present in all French regions, where its posters, decorated with the tricolored flame, are to be seen. The 60,000 claimed party members are different from those labelled Extreme Right wing in the 1970's. Candidates are flocking to the National Front: there were more than 1,500 of them defending the colors of the Extreme Right in March 1985. The preparation of National Assembly and regional assembly lists of the National Front is evidence of the power of attraction of the movement. There will be numerous recruits from the traditional Right wing, as well as provincial personalities, on the electoral lists of the National Front in March 1986.

So why do we see this sudden vigor on the part of a party which, since its creation in October 1972, had seemed to be losing its vigor? And what do the March 1986 elections teach us about the future of this political movement?

A Sudden Apparition

The explosion of the National Front in the European elections of June 1984 surprised all observers. In 3 years the Extreme Right went up from 0.29 percent of the vote (on 24 June 1981) to 10.95 percent of the valid votes. In 1983 there were four early signs of this exceptional upward movement. The Le Pen list received 11.26 percent of the valid votes in the 20th arrondissement of Paris in March 1983. In September 1983 the list headed by Jean-Pierre Stirbois, the second ranking leader of the National Front, obtained 16.72 percent of the valid votes in Dreux. In November 1983 a National Front list in Aulnay-sous-Bois, headed by a relatively unknown person, took 9.32 percent of the valid votes. These three municipal "successes" convinced Jean-Marie Le Pen that it was time to enter the National Assembly elections. On the

occasion of a legislative by-election in the second district of the Department of Morbihan he picked up 12.02 percent of the valid votes on 11 December 1983. After years of remaining on the sidelines, the Extreme Right seemed to have come out of the shadows. It remained to be seen whether it would take up the challenge of national elections. Its last previous experience, at the time of the European elections of 10 June 1979, had resulted in a shattering defeat: with 1.33 percent of the votes, the European Right wing list was last of the nine lists presenting themselves to the public in the polling places. Just 5 years later the Le Pen list was on an equal plane with the Communist Party and became the fifth party in what had previously been the "gang of four."

We might have thought that, after this bout of fever, the voters attracted by Jean-Marie Le Pen would return to a more peaceful outlook. The history of the three offensives by the Extreme Right since World War II argued that things would work out in this way. The Poujade protest of January 1956, the Right wing activist opposition to the government in April 1962, and the nostalgia expressed for Tixier-Vignancour in December 1965 had only been flashes in the pan. That does not seem to be the case with the eruption of Le Pen in the 1980's. However, 10 March 1985 does not seem to have been very favorable for the new arrivals on the political scene. The National Front had candidates in three-quarters of the cantons holding elections and attracted 8.8 percent of the valid votes. Still, this was a record for the Extreme Right in the cantonal elections which leads us to believe that the National Front has the support of about 10 percent of the voters in a national election. In effect, it was not able to find any supporters in about one-quarter of the cantons, and it presented no candidates there. In the cantons where it had candidates, it "held onto" its 1984 electoral support and made particular progress in the urban areas. For example, in the 90 cantons holding elections in the Rhone-Alps region where it presented candidates in 1985 the National Front went up from 7.1 percent of the registered voters in 1984 to 7.4 percent in 1985. For the first time in several decades the Extreme Right succeeded in "holding" its voters. The "bout of fever," far from disappearing, has continued. So why this appearance of the Extreme Right and the electoral confirmation of its strength in the France of 1983-86?

The 'Why's and Wherefore's'

There are many explanations. Certain observers look to the economy: the economic crisis, unemployment, and the insecurity flowing from them allegedly prepared the way for a French style neo-fascism. Others look for the answer in culture: the dominant system of values, under the effects of the crisis, reportedly has been changing since 1980 in the direction of a growing authoritarianism particularly suited to the outlook of the National Front. Others still look for answers in history: in their view the Jean-Marie Le Pen movement is nothing more than the reactivation of a very French tradition, that of a reactionary Right which for more than 3 decades has been effectively excluded from French political life since the liberation in 1944-45. Finally, the last group of observers looks to psychology: the reappearance in force of the Extreme Right is stated to be due to "the Le Pen effect," to the popularity of a demagogue, "overendowed with a simplistic outlook," who allegedly has occupied the space left vacant by the conversion of the Left to realism.

All of these explanations compete in throwing light on the breakthrough of the Extreme Right, but we must note their limitations. The present economic crisis developed in France over the period between 1973 and 1982 without leading to an increase in the political attraction of the Extreme Right, which won 0.52 percent of the vote in 1973, 0.76 percent in 1974, 0.75 percent in 1978, 1.33 percent in 1979, and 0.29 percent in 1981. The rigorous cultural movement back to the center at the beginning of the 1980's could just as easily have found a political outlet in the "Bonapartist" tradition which in some respects perpetuates the neo-Gaullism of Jacques Chirac. Regarding the resurgence of an old, slow moving, historical current, we know that history does not always evolve in the same way. The Boulanger style militarism of the late 19th century often drew strength from the socialist and radical traditions of the Extreme Left. This is not the case with the National Front. The French fascist organizations of the 1930's were marked with the seal of anti-capitalism, which has largely disappeared from the entourage of Jean-Marie Le Pen. Finally, regarding "the Le Pen psychological effect," how can we ignore the fact that the man has been active in French political life for the past 30 years? He was elected to the National Assembly on two occasions, in 1956 and 1958, and was a candidate in the 1974 presidential elections. He is not a new figure on the political scene and had not made much of an impact until recently. So why should a man and ideas which had not made much of a mark for decades have found such an echo in the period since 1983? A precise analysis of the electoral bases of the National Front makes it possible to provide a partial answer. An analysis of electoral returns and data obtained from polls² has led us to discover an electorate whose sociology is dynamic and whose political profile is rather diversified. On the other hand, this electorate is very homogenous in terms of the things it opposes, which bring it together, and the fears which nourish it.

A Dynamic Sociology

In certain respects the portion of the electorate supporting the National Front is more of a sociological twin of the electorate of the Left than the electorate of the traditional Right. It is not an electorate where the social characteristics of the traditional Right: that is, mostly feminine, on in years, bourgeois, and devout, are particularly evident. On the contrary, the National Front electorate is very masculine, well represented among the young people, a mixture of social classes, and is not generally religious in outlook. Without a doubt, it is the most definitely "male" electorate: 60 percent of the voters of the Extreme Right are men, whereas men are a minority (48 percent) of the French electorate as a whole and of the electorate of the traditional Right (45 percent). This is an electorate which has not yet retired, on the whole. Moreover, people 75 years old and older have their reservations about the National Front and gave only 3 percent of their votes to it in the elections held on 10 March 1985. On the other hand, the Extreme Right is attractive to mature voters (35 to 64 years old) and to young people: 9.6 percent of the 18-24 year old age group and 10.4 percent of the students voted for the National Front. This electorate, which is younger than that of the traditional Right, also includes a mixture of social classes. The National Front is electorally well represented in all social groups. Bourgeois groups (the liberal professions and senior cadres) and working class groups (laborers, salaried employees) gave 8 to 10 percent of their votes to the National Front. Contrary to a widely held view, the working class is not

particularly attracted to the National Front: 8.2 percent of working class voters supported a candidate of the National Front on 10 March 1985. At the time of the European elections, on 17 June 1984, only 8.8 percent of them voted for Jean-Marie Le Pen's list, whereas the National Front obtained 11 percent of the votes among voters as a whole. On the other hand, one social group which was attracted to Poujade 30 years ago is once again listening to the sirens of the Extreme Right: the proprietors of small businesses, tradesmen, and factory owners. In 1984 some 21 percent of this group voted for Jean-Marie Le Pen. In 1985 14.6 percent of them supported the National Front. As distinguished from Poujadism, the National Front has not limited itself to this bastion of small merchants and craftsmen and has run up an appreciable vote in more "modern" social groups: 9.4 percent of salaried employees of the private sector and 9.6 percent of senior cadres and the liberal professional group. This aspect of "modernity" is found again in the cultural area. The voters supporting the National Front tend to be outside the religious tradition. It has its best percentage of the vote among non-practicing Catholics (9.9 percent) and is weaker among regularly practicing Catholics (7.2 percent). The message of tolerance of the French bishops has more of an impact than traditional activism among the Catholic faithful.

From the sociological point of view, the voters supporting the National Front are not typical of the voters of the traditional Right. Reflecting rather faithfully the diversity of French society, this new group of voters holds rather contrasting political views.

A Heterogeneous Political Profile

More than half of the electorate of the National Front comes from the traditional Right: 55 percent of those who voted on 10 March 1985 for the Extreme Right had voted for Valéry Giscard d'Estaing on 10 May 1981. However, more than 40 percent of the voters for the National Front come from other groups: 22 percent voted in favor of François Mitterrand on 10 May 1981. Some 19 percent did not vote in that election because of age or because they wished to abstain. Therefore, some people who were "disappointed with socialism" did not hesitate to travel the long road which leads from the Left to the Extreme Right. Some observers concluded somewhat hastily that they thought they recognized many communist voters among these deserters from the Left. That was not the case at all. Among the elements of the Left which went over to the National Front, it was the communists who were the fewest: only 1.5 percent of the communist voters of 1981 voted in the European elections of 1984 for the National Front. Some 5 percent of the socialist voters of 1981, 10 percent of the UDF voters, and 16 percent of the RPR voters supported the National Front in the European elections of 1984.

A Vigorous Social Protest

This relatively heterogeneous character of the Extreme Right electorate had its greatest impact when it proved that the Extreme Right has succeeded in moving beyond its traditional sphere and sinking its roots in the electorate of the traditional Right and, to a lesser extent, in the electorate of the Left. This multi-faceted character of the Extreme Right may also be a source of weakness, to the extent that many voters of the Extreme Right continue to

vote for political parties other than the National Front. Only 52 percent of the voters of the Extreme Right say that they feel close to the National Front. On the other hand, some 18 percent support the RPR, 8 percent support the UDF, and 4 percent, the Socialist Party. There is sharp competition between the National Front and other parties from the parliamentary opposition group over these Extreme Right voters, who are split between various party allegiances. Therefore, the centrifugal forces operating on the National Front electorate are not inconsiderable. However, any dispersion of these voters seems unlikely because of their very strong and homogeneous motivations.

Whereas the triple motivations affecting the vote of the French people as a whole is highly economic--jobs, taxes, and purchasing power--the motivations of the voters for the National Front are much more oriented to social questions. Although 41 percent of the National Front voters consider that jobs are one of the subjects which have most influence on their vote, some 73 percent of them place the questions of insecurity, crime, and immigrants in first place. These are the three concerns of the voters of the National Front. Jean-Marie Le Pen's movement owes its success to the fact that it somewhat hastily amalgamated these three themes into a few formulas with a devastating impact: "3 Million Unemployed = 3 Million Too Many Immigrants" and "Immigration = Insecurity." The leader of the National Front politically crystallized the resentments and protests of many French who, irritated by 10 years of crisis, are looking for scapegoats: the state, immigrants, criminals, and minority groups. This political crystallization was made all the easier since the arrival of the Left in power made "these odds and sods, these black sheep who cause all the trouble" all the more visible. The recruitment of civil servants and the various acts of nationalization made the state budget that much larger. The laws of October 1981 on the entry and stay of foreigners and on the regularization of the status of illegal immigrants stabilized the immigrant population. Finally, the amnesty, the end of special criminal courts, and the abolition of the death penalty went against the grain of a society which, since 1980, has felt "a wind of authority"⁴ blowing through it. It remained for Jean-Marie Le Pen to offer a political outlet for all of these protests, which were particularly strongly rooted in urban concerns. For about the past 10 years the growth of the cities has stopped. The urban world is no longer the kind of "new frontier" which drew millions of French people in the 1950's and 1960's. The city is seen more and more as a finite, limited, immobile universe in which the various communities must learn how to live together. In a context of crisis this closed area is made to order for the accumulation of irritations and fears. The most popular of these issues appear to be feelings of insecurity and the rejection of immigrants.

The Area of Urban Concerns

A brief look at the voting map for the National Front shows that the bulk of its voters are in urban France to the East of a line from Rouen to Perpignan (see Map 1). In most elections western and west-central rural France is mission territory for the Extreme Right. The urban roots of the Extreme Right are new and mark a break with the rural base of Poujadism (see Map 4). Finally, it only partially overlaps the southern area of the map of those who are nostalgic for French Algeria (Maps 2 and 3). This urban France in which the National Front has its roots is also that part of France where the largest


communities of immigrants are concentrated. It is in this urban and cosmopolitan area that feelings of insecurity and the rejection of immigrants have developed in particular. These are two essential motivations for the Extreme Right vote.

However, may we conclude that this feeling of insecurity and this rejection of immigrants are closely related to objective insecurity and the presence of large numbers of immigrants with whom the National Front voters would be in closer contact than others? This is questionable. At times this view is expressed too hastily on the basis of a comparison between maps of departments showing the vote of the Extreme Right and those showing immigration and urbanization.


On the one hand recent studies⁵ have shown that the connection between objective insecurity and the feeling of insecurity was very tenuous. Often, the feeling of insecurity is not the result of individual experience but rather of collective experience. That is, the experience of groups of people of whom the individual is a part. Often making up these groups are urban neighbors whose fear is the fear of nearby border areas which these residents know very little about or only incompletely. A careful review of electoral returns for the Extreme Right in large cities leads to the conclusion that the Extreme Right vote does not always break records in residential areas where objective insecurity is the greatest.

On the other hand once you leave aside regional or departmental analysis and observe the commune or the residential quarter, the relationship between a strong Extreme Right vote and the presence of immigrants has a tendency to disappear. An analysis relating the percentage of immigrants and the percentage of votes in favor of the Extreme Right in the European elections of June 1984 in the 32 communes of the Grenoble metropolitan area confirms that there is no clear relationship between the two phenomena. Peaceful, residential communes, bourgeois in social composition and without any significant immigrant presence, gave from 11 to 17 percent of their votes to the Le Pen list in 1984: for example, the communes of Bresson, Corenc, Meylan, Biviers, Montbonnot, Le Fontanil, and Saint-Ismier. On the other hand, working class communes with large immigrant populations gave less than 11 percent of their votes to Jean-Marie Le Pen: for example, the communes of Fontaine, Saint-Martin-d'Heres, Froges, Villard-Bonnot, and Domene. The Extreme Right did not break any records in areas where the voters are living in close proximity to large immigrant communities. The immigrant presence seems to structure the Extreme Right vote, but only indirectly. Rather than being centers of large groups of immigrants, the areas where the Extreme Right made its greatest impact were often areas where there are large concentrations of immigrants on the periphery. It is in this kind of residential area, with quiet buildings and homes, with its settled population accustomed to feeling secure, that the immigrant is most rejected. He is not a neighbor, but one can see him on the edges of the neighborhood. The picture emerges here of what might be expected from an authoritarian electorate. Maps prepared under the influence of the National Front are largely a kind of cartography of fear in modern cities. This is what Anne Cauquelin used to say was related to the borders which open onto danger and "imagining those individuals who, on


the other side, organize themselves like enemies, with their customs, their language, and their skills in housebreaking, which are always exaggerated."




Map 1 - 1984 European Elections: the Le Pen List



Map 2 - First Round of 1965 Presidential Elections:
Tixier-Vignancourt Vote



Map 3 - April 1962 Referendum: the 'No' Vote



Map 4 - 1956 Legislative Elections: Poujade Plus the Extreme Right

Since 1982 Jean-Marie Le Pen has made use of these concerns of city dwellers, who are exasperated by the crisis and affected by political disillusionment. He has brought them together and has exploited them shamelessly. That is one of the keys to the success of the National Front. What is the future of this political movement, nourished on complex concerns and simplistic acts of exorcism?

The National Front and the Elections of March 1986

As the elections of 16 March 1986 approach, six major questions come up:

[Question] Will the breakthrough of the National Front cause trouble and, if so, at what level?

[Answer] The good performance of the National Front in the cantonal elections of March 1985 showed that this movement was something other than a passing phenomenon. The National Front seems to have gone beyond the analogy of a "bout of fever" which disappears quickly and which characterized all of the movements of the Extreme Right since 1945. After having proved itself in two elections in which no major national interests were involved, the European elections of 1984 and the cantonal elections of 1985, the National Front is faced for the first time with a decisive national election. The polls state that the National Front will have 8-9 percent of the vote, whatever the strategy of union or disunion adopted by the parties of the parliamentary opposition. Therefore, compared to its vote of 11 percent obtained at the time of the European elections, the National Front is going through a slight decline, due to the shift of some of its voters toward the RPR and the UDF lists. The competition with the RPR seems to be particularly strong. On the evening of 10 March 1985 some 16 percent of the National Front voters were considering voting for the party of Jacques Chirac in the legislative elections. Some 10 percent were considering voting for "various Right wing parties," and 8 percent for the UDF. Therefore, Jean-Marie Le Pen risks seeing rather deep inroads made into his supporters. However, since 1984 the National Front has tended to "hold onto" its voters more and more. Only 45 percent of Jean-Marie Le Pen's voters were considering voting for a National Front list in the legislative elections, as of 17 June 1984. Nevertheless, only a few months later, on 10 March 1985, 60 percent of the National Front voters were considering voting for a Jean-Marie Le Pen list. The level of influence of the Extreme Right on the evening of 16 March 1986 will depend largely on its capacity to turn its electors of that day into faithful supporters. Bringing together the party faithful and winning over the "lukewarm"--these are the two principal objectives of any political party during an election campaign.

[Question] What about the "lukewarm" supporters? Does the National Front have electoral reserves?

[Answer] The principal ideas hammered home by the National Front have attracted a current of sympathy going well beyond its 8 to 9 percent of the registered voters. About 31 percent of the French voters approve of the position of Jean-Marie Le Pen on immigration. About 29 percent of the voters approve of his position on security and justice, and 24 percent approve of his defense of traditional values. It is among these sympathizers that the National Front recruits new supporters. About 17 percent of the French voters consider, in effect, that it is not out of the question that they will vote for the National Front at some time in the future. A well conducted campaign can attract some of these potential voters to the Extreme Right. It will still be necessary for the National Front to provide itself with the image of a "respectable" party.

[Question] Will the National Front succeed in attracting "national leaders"?

[Answer] The National Front remains the party of a popular leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and old figures from the Extreme Right. The latter, including Roger Holeindre, Jean-Pierre Stirbois, Roland Gaucher, or Bernard Anthony will lead the lists of the National Front in the legislative elections in the Departments of Essone, Hauts-de-Seine, Somme, and Tarn. However, for the past year the National Front has no longer looked like a more or less emaciated group of former agitators. First of all, the membership has grown to the point where it succeeded in presenting more than 1,500 candidates in the cantonal elections of March 1985, whereas it was barely able to present 65 candidates in the elections of March 1982. In March 1986 the National Front will be present everywhere and will have more than 2,000 candidates. Finally, the National Front, under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen and Jean-Pierre Stirbois, has undertaken the job of bringing "major personalities" into the party by welcoming people from the traditional Right and distinguished persons in society and in the economy. Former deputies of the traditional Right, such as Pascal Arrighi, Gabriel Domenech, and Edouard-Frederic Dupont, will appear on the lists of the National Front. Figures who have transferred from the RPR (Bruno Chauviere in the Department of Nord and Georges de Cornois in the Department of Oise) or from the UDF (Jean Roussel, from the Department of Bouches-du-Rhone) will participate in the legislative and regional elections. Finally, many socially and economically prominent people will lend all of their weight: Francois Bachelot, delegate general of the Chambers of Liberal Professions in the Department of Seine-Saint-Denis, Pierre Descaves, vice president of the SNPMI in the Department of the Oise, Jacques Vaysse-Tempe, president of the Assembly of French Citizens Repatriated from North Africa and municipal councilor in the Department of Haute-Garonne, and Bruno Megret, president of the Committees of Republican Action in the Department of Isere.

This strategy of "attracting notable personalities" from all directions has led to a hostile reaction among some members of the party apparatus who split off and established the National Opposition Front on 23 November 1985. No doubt the National Front hopes that the loss of a few party members will be largely compensated for by new voters who are sure of the "power of attraction" of the Extreme Right.

[Question] Will the National Front attract enough voters to deprive the traditional Right of electoral victory?

[Answer] With 8 to 9 percent of the votes and about 30 deputies in the National Assembly, according to projections on the breakdown of seats, ¹⁰ the National Front seems to be unable to deprive the parliamentary opposition of a victory in March 1986. With about 50 percent of the voters intending to vote for it, the traditional Right should control more than 300 seats in the National Assembly (an absolute majority consists of 289 seats). However, in case of weakness or divisions in the government majority, the National Front could well play the role of "trouble maker." Let's not forget that in 1956 Pierre Poujade, with about 50 deputies, deprived the Center-Right coalition of victory. It should be said that the Center-Right at that time was much weaker than the Right and the Center of today. Although the National Front has

little chance of becoming a government party at the national level, this is not the case at the regional level.

[Question] Can the National Front become a party with regional power?

[Answer] The influence of the Extreme Right which, in 1984, had gone beyond the barrier of 10 percent of the votes in 11 of the 22 French regions, can realistically aim at opening the doors of several regional executive authorities. Everything will then depend on the attitude of the traditional Right. If the traditional Right wants to keep or win certain regions, it will have to choose between an alliance with the Extreme Right and the third force. Which will win out, between the firmness of its statements refusing to collaborate with the Extreme Right or its hostility toward the socialists? Such a question could come up on the evening of 16 March 1986 in the regions of Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur, Languedoc-Roussillon, Ile-de-France, or Picardie. Whether or not they are given ministerial portfolios, the representatives of the National Front will be solidly installed in most of the regional assemblies.

[Question] How will the National Front stand up under the test of parliamentary representation?

[Answer] Proportional representation is going to permit the entry in force of deputies of the Extreme Right in the National Assembly and in the regional assemblies. This parliamentary recognition can provide new legitimacy to the National Front which, at the moment, suffers from a certain lack of credibility regarding its capacities as a party in power. The history of the parliamentary fortunes of the Extreme Right indicates that the power of the National Front will tend to trickle away into the parliamentary sands. This was the case with the Poujadist group in the National Assembly after 1956. However, as we have seen, the National Front has a sociological dynamism, a political structure, and personnel who were not available to the Poujade movement. The National Front is decidedly not a thing of the past.

5170

CSO: 3519/174

KYP LEADERSHIP SAID TO BE FULLY POLITICIZED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 3 Jun 86 p 1

[Text] The position of deputy chief of the KYP [Central Intelligence Service] will be assumed by former secretary general of the Ministry of Public Order K. Tsimas as soon as the new law on the KYP is approved. This conclusion can be clearly drawn from the statements made yesterday by the government spokesman, who had remained silent when this information had appeared in an opposition newspaper 2 weeks ago, but who hastened yesterday to confirm an article in the well-known publication that is so dear to the government.

In answer to a question on the subject, Mr Papaioannou specified that under the present legal status of the KYP no civilian can be appointed to the position of deputy chief of the organization. However, this will be made possible with the approval of the new law. He added that "he is not committing himself" for the period immediately following the passage of the new law on the KYP.

It should be noted that Mr Tsimas, together with Mr Tsouras and also the replaced leadership of the Greek Police, had repeatedly been criticized by the opposition as unfit for his position at the Ministry of Public Order.

When the Ministry of Public Order came under Mr Drosogiannis, both Mr Tsouras and Mr Tsimas (who "resigned" in order to facilitate the new minister), as well as the leadership of the police were dismissed from this sensitive sector. This had been interpreted as proof of a change in government policy on issues pertaining to the Ministry of Public Order at a moment that was so critical for the government's credibility in confronting terrorism. The impression had also been created that the new minister, Mr Drosogiannis, would be the principal figure in carrying out the new attitude. Of course, the government had stated right from the beginning that another important government position would be given to Mr Tsimas after his "resignation." However, his appointment to the KYP position when this organization is being restructured minimizes the meaning of his dismissal from the Ministry of Public Order.

It is also emphasized that meanwhile, another person has been appointed to the leadership of the KYP who has been publicly criticized by the opposition (Mr Makedos, well-known after the offending report he had written on Greek Americans when he was serving at the Greek Embassy in Washington).

Political observers believe that Mr Makedos' and Mr Tsimas' appointment to the KYP should be interpreted as characteristic of the government's choice of a climate of confrontation vis-a-vis the opposition. While filling the positions of head and deputy chief of the KYP is the exclusive competence of the government, the latter cannot choose individuals who have repeatedly--and not without justification--been criticized by the opposition, especially when the government calls on it to form a "national responsibility front."

/12232

CSO: 3521/161

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

EANES FAVORING LEFTIST FRONT--During a recent meeting with a group of Pintasilgo supporters, Eanes expressed interest in the convocation of a convention of the left, and declared that he favors a strategy involving a front that would bring together forces from the PRD, the PS, the PCP and independents, a coalition that would be able to claim power from the right and govern the country. [Text]
[Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 24 May 86 p 64] /12232

CSO: 3542/115

REPORTAGE ON TCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE SIXTH PLENUM

Central Committee Statement

TA271808 (Clandestine) Voice of the Turkish Communist Party in Turkish
1700 GMT 26 May 86

[Turkish Communist Party Central Committee statement on its Sixth Plenum,
dated 26 May]

[Text] The Sixth Plenum of the Turkish Communist Party [TCP] Central Committee has convened. The plenum discussed the Political Bureau report read by Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Haydar Kutlu. It analyzed the situation in the country and the world at large and determined the party's duties. It also reviewed the preparations for a national conference. It discussed and approved the 1986 TCP national conference (?notebook) and decided that it will be opened to discussion within the party and by the public following the necessary [word indistinct]. The plenum also discussed the steps to be taken for the national conference to succeed.

One cannot talk about a qualitative change in the regime despite a new series of [word indistinct] as a result of the determined struggle by the democratic forces. Claiming that Turkey is on the path of democracy, the Evren-Ozal dictatorship and its supporters within the imperialist camp are, through various maneuvers, trying to prevent the people and the democratic forces from forming a determined opposition. They are also trying to confuse, divided, and destroy the people and democratic forces, and to isolate the leftist forces. While U.S. imperialism is quickly taking steps to further commit Turkey to its war plans and to cause tension in Turkey's relations with its neighbors, the last vestiges of the nation's economy are being destroyed, dependence on imperialism increased, and workers and syndical rights curbed and further through bills adopted by the parliament.

The TCP appeals for a mobilization to halt the United States and the dictatorship is gaining a new dimension under the current conditions. The Sixth Plenum has determined that currently there are more possibilities to realize such a mobilization and to create a united democratic mass movement for peace and democracy. The Izmir rally of the Turkish Confederation of Labor [Turk-Is], which was the first powerful mass political protest against the dictatorship and which was realized through the joint effort of the broad

democratic forces, together with the participation of the communists, as well as this year's May Day celebrations, which had the same characteristics, are clear evidence of these possibilities. The fact that the Turk-Is Leaders Council has decided on new rallies and a general strike, and that the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) administration had noted the necessity for demanding rights by taking to the streets with the people, shows that it is possible for the large masses to walk together with the comrades who participated in the Izmir rally.

The Sixth Plenum has once again stressed that the major problem in halting a deterioration of the situation in all areas, in halting the fascist dictatorship, and in realizing a general amelioration of the situation, is one of securing the unity of all forces in favor of peace and democracy. Such unity can be realized only through the belief that it is possible for Turkey to be saved from the current situation, and through a convergence around a strong conviction in the path to liberation. The TCP has presented in detail its national democracy program regarding Turkey's liberation through the documents entitled "The TCP National Democracy Alternative," and "The TCP Reform Program for the Turkish Armed Forces," adopted by the Sixth Plenum, and through the previously adopted document, "The TCP Peace, National Security, and National Sovereignty Alternative."

The TCP Central Committee Sixth Plenum has given all communists the duty of discussing the TCP alternative proposals with all the democratic forces, and of developing a dialogue and cooperation with these forces in preparing for the national conference. Furthermore, it has also given them the duty of familiarizing the masses, including those in factories, workplaces, districts, villages, schools, and universities, with the party views. The TCP has taken the necessary measures to achieve these goals. The TCP plenum has declared its unconditional support for the determined inclination [as heard] among the ranks of the democratic opposition and has drawn attention to the wrong inclinations among these ranks. The TCP will increase its effort to draw the masses into a political struggle and to strengthen the mass movement. To this end, the TCP will continue its political campaigns for the abolition of the defense cooperation agreement, a general political amnesty, syndical rights, and the economic and political rights of the toilers, as well as its campaigns against the U.S. bases, tortures, arrests, oppression of the Kurdish people, unemployment, layoffs, and low wages.

The Sixth Plenum discussed the proposal submitted by various leftist circles to form a legal leftist or socialist party, and it decided that given the current conditions such a move would not help the leftist forces fulfill their duties in the struggle for democracy or help strengthen leftist unity and socialist ideals. The plenum called on all citizens and democratic forces to exert every possible effort to halt the government project to sell the public economic enterprises to the private sector, and to prevent the United States from using the bases in Turkey against our neighbors. The plenum also stressed that the ever increasing slander campaign against our neighbor Bulgaria facilitates the U.S. Administration's moves to use Turkey for its own aggressive plans, and it called on all democratic forces to take a sound and responsible stand and to more actively oppose this campaign.

The plenum also assessed the 27th CPSU Congress and adopted a special resolution drawing attention to the historic significance of the congress and its enlightening effect on the struggle for peace and social progress. It called on all of the nation's democratic forces to respond positively to the constructive and responsible stand taken by the Soviet Union regarding world and regional peace, and friendship and cooperation among people. The plenum also called on all communists and all the other revolutionaries to take as an example the Leninist path of the Soviet communists in their daily activities.

The TCP is preparing for its national conference in a revolutionary and struggle-oriented spirit, bearing in mind its grave responsibilities. We have all the preconditions to enable our national conference to be the springboard toward reaching the goal of a stronger TCP. The party organizations and all communists should prepare themselves for the national conference in the spirit of the communist struggle and should achieve their goals by fulfilling all their duties. Everything should be directed toward the success of the national conference.

[signed] TCP Central Committee, 26 May 1986

First Installment of Kutlu Address

TA281420 (Clandestine) Voice of the Turkish Communist Party in Turkish
0400 GMT 28 May 86

[First installment of opening speech by Haydar Kutlu, secretary general of the Turkish Communist Party Central Committee, at the Central Committee Sixth Plenum; date and place not given--read by announcer]

[Text] Dear comrades. I am opening the Turkish Communist Party [TCP] Central Committee Sixth Plenum. The entire party is aware of the significance of this plenum. The reports from our party organizations, the numerous letters sent to the party organs, and the meetings we held following the announcement of our decision to hold a national conference indicate that our party members are enthusiastic about this decision. Our party organizations' work on this matter began with the Political Bureau's proposal concerning preliminary work on the conference. Currently, all our organizations are conducting this work and expecting a new direction from the Central Committee Sixth Plenum. In this plenum we will discuss the theses of our national conference and conduct intensive work regarding many topics.

What will be the major emphasis of this work and the TCP national conference? What is the essence of the work the TCP wants to carry out and the goals it wishes to attain? We must again point out a topic which we always stress. In its history, Turkey has never faced such severe deterioration. However, this situation also constitutes the basis for the emergence of very wide-ranging and dynamic forces for the salvation of our country. Deep-rooted and democratic transformations in the economic, social, and all other fields are becoming apparent. This creates an extraordinary opportunity for us.

Unprecedentedly large democratic forces can now unite and pave the way for a positive change in the country's destiny for the next 100 years. What should be done to this end? First we must ensure that everyone realizes this fact, which we have expressed in simple language. In other words, we must explain repeatedly that Turkey is facing a historic opportunity. To be able to realize and exploit this fact, one must first carry out a consistent and determined policy and struggle within the highly unstable atmosphere in our country. This point is crucial for the democratic forces. Why? The unstable atmosphere is creating new situations. We must of course observe all the circumstances. However, this must not cause us to waver or hesitate in our basic policy.

Second, the dictatorship's tactics should not be allowed to deceive the democratic forces, especially the leftist forces. Through its known tactic of a return to democracy, which it was obliged to resort to, the dictatorship made certain concessions. However, it also created significant opportunities for itself. It is, on the one hand, holding on to the fascist state mechanism to be used in one way and degree or another when necessary, and even strengthening this mechanism; on the other hand, through the civilian government and parliament it is exerting an ideological and political influence on the masses that would not be possible through a naked dictatorship. It is able to deceive the democratic forces and even the leftist forces and the masses. Its chief goal consists of preventing the unity of the democratic forces and dividing them, and of obstructing rapprochement between the leftist forces and other democratic forces. It is necessary not to be deceived by these tactics and to separate the leftists from other democratic forces by wrongly assuming that a gradual transition to democracy is underway.

This is the message we want to relay to our people and all democratic forces. Our people should choose their own regime, their own future, and their own path of development. U.S. imperialism, the Evren-Ozal dictatorship, and the owners of big capital who support the dictatorship are the arch-enemies trying to prevent these goals from being achieved. An end should be put to U.S. interference in our domestic affairs and to the U.S. military and political presence in our country. Our people should be freed from the U.S. yoke. The Evren-Ozal dictatorship should be overthrown and it should be made to account for its deeds in order to prevent future 12 September coups. These goals can be attained only through the unity of all forces against U.S. imperialism and the dictatorship, the establishment of a united mass democratic movement [words indistinct]. These views constitute the fundamental principles of our national conference theses. In these theses, we are presenting in detail the national democracy alternative which is the most realistic alternative to the current regime.

The party program approved by our Fifth Congress serves as a sound guide. Developments in the country have proved that our program is right. Our policy, which responds to concrete development, is not derived from the simple and logical principles of our program but from the concrete situation and an empirical struggle, under the guidance of our program. Political developments have not only proved our policy correct but have also proved our

program correct. In the beginning, some of our comrades and friends who could not see the dialectic ties between our program and policy thought that these two were contradictory. There were even those who attempted to confront the program against the policy. The empirical class struggle was the best reply to this confrontation. Such anomalies have become rare. The reason we refer to it is that such views have caused us to think more profoundly about our activities.

The creative implementation of Marxism-Leninism in accordance with our national characteristics is now becoming a lively theoretical and empirical experiment. The national conference will transform this experiment into practical lessons. What are we trying to realize with our theses? The TCP is showing the realistic and revolutionary path to put an end to the fascist dictatorship and to establish a national democracy in order to prevent the deterioration of the situation in the country and to achieve an amelioration. A turn for the better may not be [passage indistinct].

Securing a turn for the better is a major issue not only in our country but on the international level as well. The aspiration to peace is the most basic and natural aspiration of humanity. What can be more natural than the right to exist? However, this most basic and natural right [words indistinct]. The threat against peace is not [words indistinct] because the source of the nuclear war threat is the aggressive policy pursued by the U.S. Administration. It has now become clear that this policy is not a passing [word indistinct] policy. The U.S. Administration is now in the hands of the military industry, the arms manufacturers and their men, the politicians. In other words, the most aggressive, reactionary, and chauvinistic forces of imperialism are the source of the war threat.

The United States has not given a single positive reply to the numerous peace proposals of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The U.S. decision to continue its nuclear experiments, the Star Wars project, the barbaric attack on Libya--without the knowledge of its allies--and the threats against our neighbors, Iran and Syria, show that the United States is determined to pursue this inauspicious policy.

Everyone in our country and the world at large can clearly see the source of the threat to peace and human development. The peace process, as you will see in detail in our Political Bureau report, is being strengthened in our country. The possibilities for a strong anti-imperialist movement to be born are increasing. There are other positive factors as well. The program to free the world from nuclear weapons by the year 2000 that was announced by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Gorbachev on 15 January 1986; the idea of an international security system put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress; the proposal to significantly reduce the number of conventional weapons in Europe made by Comrade Gorbachev at the 11th SED Congress; the Soviet proposals on banning chemical weapons; the withdrawal of foreign fleets from the Mediterranean; the solution of the Palestinian and Cyprus problems; and other peace initiatives have stirred a significant reaction in our country as well.

Our Central Committee will dwell on the 27th CPSU Congress, and we believe we are not exaggerating in calling it a historic event. We should immediately add that even those in our country who are opposed to the Soviet Union have not been able to ignore this congress. However, we should add that the Turkish radio and television and the yellow press, which are the mouthpieces of imperialism and the dictatorship in our country, consider it their duty to conceal from our people the responsible and constructive stand of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries regarding the future of humanity and the peace movement gaining strength in the world. We cannot say that we are taking every step to inform our people on the peace proposals of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. We should not assume that our people know everything that we know. We should not refrain from repeatedly explaining to our people these peace proposals and responsible stands.

The current world situation is such that even those who do not embrace socialism can see that it is in their interest to be friends with the Soviet Union. Current domestic and foreign conditions facilitate the explanation of this reality to these circles. Making these forces, which are not ready to embrace socialism, see these realities will also serve to turn back blatant anti-communism and anti-sovietism, which is the primary goal of our current ideological struggle.

Comrades, at this time communists must completely adhere to the reliable principles of Marxism-Leninism and follow with a lively interest new developments in the world. The 27th CPSU Congress has been a guide in our search in this direction and has encouraged our efforts. Political reaction continues to be the invariable and deepening characteristic of present-day capitalism. Capitalism incessantly nurtures reaction. On the other hand, through its ideological campaigns and its sometimes-overt, sometimes-covert brutal interventions in people's political lives, imperialism is further strengthening reaction and providing thus for a forceful shift to the right.

The deepening economic and social disintegration in our country, along with cultural deterioration and decadence, make a serious ideological struggle imperative. This negative situation is influencing the leftist movement in an ideological sense. Any movement which does not examine the concrete and active problems created by socialist developments is doomed to be ideologically corrupt. No movement can continue to exist under such circumstances. As a result, aimless discussions lead to neglecting the main enemy and indulging in mere internal struggles, and the movement becomes prey to internal dissensions and divisions.

In the wake of the Fifth Congress of our party, we have dealt specifically with the main issues. Currently, our party is not neglecting any issue by saying it does not concern us. This stand increases interest in theoretical and practical fields. From now on this interest will be intensified. It must not be forgotten that in our time, the basis for ideological struggles is the fight being waged between the reactionary and progressive forces.

When considered from this point of view, it can be observed that a healthy movement which is seeking a way to liberate our country, which is close to Marxism-Leninism, and which is composed of a broadening force of revolutionary and democratic forces, is coming alive. We, the communists, want to unite our search for a solution with theirs. This is possible only if we are not bound by ideological conformity.

Capitalism's internationalization is currently being intensified. This development increases by many times the importance of proletarian internationalism compared with the past and provides it with a broader area of influence, increasing the importance of international solidarity.

The general crisis of capitalism is deepening. The domestic instability of capitalist economies is widening through minor structural crises. Mass unemployment and inflation are becoming permanent problems of those economies. We can clearly see the destructive results of these problems in our own country. In the same way, western democracies, which are praised in a bid to minimize the superiority of socialist democracies, are suffering from deep crises.

All these developments accelerate the heightening of the working class struggle and encourage the struggle being waged against the monopolies by the non-proletarian sections of the people and the broad-scale middle classes. As a result of these developments and under the influence of socialism, the mass democratic movements are gaining extraordinary strength. This development, along with the mass peace movements, represent one of the most characteristic traits of our time.

Another new characteristic of our present-day capitalist world is the blatant interference of the United States in the internal affairs of not only developing but also of developed countries, in order to forcibly impose its policies on them, and the appearance of a national conscience in view of the increasing nuclear destructive threat.

The contrast between the people who are most clearly in favor of the preservation of world peace, and imperialism's most reactionary, aggressive, chauvinistic, and war-mongering forces, is gaining both a national and international understanding. This contrast has become an integral part of the fundamental difference between socialism and capitalism in our time.

Currently, this reality can be observed to a greater degree in our country. The working class in our country, which is the fundamental revolutionary class of our time, today faces such challenges as struggling in the front lines for the preservation of world peace, fighting against foreign capitalistic and domestic exploiters, and trying to overcome the fascist dictatorship. Our working class is obliged to save the entire nation by liberating itself. It must become the saving class of our country. The TCP is convinced that the moment it is equipped with true and appropriate policies, our working class will be able to accomplish this task. Our party is working toward this end. Views expressed in our arguments are based on these general considerations.

Second Installment of Kutlu Address

TA281353 (Clandestine) Voice of the Turkish Communist Party in Turkish
0400 GMT 29 May 86

[Second and last installment of opening speech by Haydar Kutlu, secretary general of the Turkish Communist Party Central Committee, at the Central Committee Sixth Plenum; date and place not given--read by announcer]

[Text] Dear Comrades. One may ask if such a detailed alternative program is necessary. It is not difficult to see that a change for the better, both in international relations and in the domestic field, is not easy to achieve. Undoubtedly, the chief task now is to eliminate the Evren-Ozal dictatorship, and achieve democracy. However, we claim that it is not possible to be satisfied with structural political freedoms that remain wholly superficial. Of course, we do not minimize these freedoms, but the fascist dictatorship cannot be uprooted unless fundamental moves are undertaken to effect deep-rooted democratic changes in the social, economic, cultural, and all other fields.

As demonstrated in detail in our theses, the change that accompanied 12 September was not a simple one. The dictatorship implemented significant and deep-rooted changes in the state and economic structure. The social implications of these changes will emerge more clearly in time. The Evren-Ozal dictatorship crushed all the positive aspects of our social development since our national liberation war and the Ataturk period, and strengthened and built in all the negative aspects. In short, Turkey is once again faced with the task of construction. Naturally, this is not yet the task of socialist construction; it is the task of constructing an independent, sovereign, democratic, and progressive Turkey. It is to this end that we are proposing the program of democratic reforms.

Another question that comes to mind is whether this is the TCP's own government program or whether it is the program of a government in which the TCP's participation is a precondition. Of course, we are not entertaining the illusion that the TCP will be able to establish a government immediately--tomorrow. However, we are saying that if it were possible and we could assume power under existing conditions, this program could be implemented. We are stating the duties and issues a democratic government is obliged to resolve, whether or not we are a part of it. Even if we do not participate in it, we will support a government that undertakes to resolve these tasks. However, there is no doubt that such a comprehensive program cannot be fully and substantially implemented unless such a government relies on the weight on the working class.

Comrades, the task before us remains unchanged. Despite new factors in developments, the regime is still in power. Our task consists of waging a struggle against the dictatorship for democracy, together with everyone. The phase of dialogue and cooperation between the democratic and leftist forces is yet to be achieved or concluded. The duty to create a united democratic movement is before us. This is why, as we stated in our report,

we cannot justify the legal Socialist Party proposal. The most important reason for this is the ideological one. A Socialist Party established within the legal framework outlined by the dictatorship is bound to lag behind its own social legitimacy. Despite the good intentions of those who proposed such a party, it would not be able to properly defend the socialist ideals. If today there is a vacuum, a social necessity in the legal field, it is absence of a communist party.

Moreover, an attempt to establish a new party without first struggling to reopen the Turkish Labor Party and the Turkish Socialist Workers Party, which were established legally and which gained both social and legal legitimacy--in other words, without first waging a struggle for extracting this democratic right from the dictatorship--would also undermine the spirit of resistance for democracy. The current task is to secure the solid unity of all democratic, leftist, and other forces in factories, workplaces, and neighborhoods based on the masses.

Comrades, we see that people outside are beginning to understand the attitude of the TCP toward the bourgeois opposition. All the same, we must note that while it is impossible to hear the breath, let alone the voice, of the illegal leftists in the bourgeois press, the following messages reach millions of people through their parties: There is no democracy in Turkey; there is torture; the United States is interfering in our internal affairs; MIT [National Intelligence Organization--FBIS] is fulfilling a negative function; militarism is continuously undermining democracy; this government is oppressing the religious; Articles 141, 142, and 163 of the Penal Code must be abolished; the Constitution must be amended; this government must be toppled; this government, this parliament, and this president are not based on the will of the people; Turkey is a country of prohibitions; May Day is the workers' holiday; and others.

Only those who cannot think with a cool head can deny the importance of disseminating these thoughts to millions of people. The TCP will not hesitate to openly support every view or move against the dictatorship on the road to democracy, regardless of its source. Naturally, we criticize the opposing attitude of these circles and will continue to do so in the future. Furthermore, we have always stated and we will always state that none of the branches of the bourgeois opposition is powerful enough to solve any of the people's real problems and that they do not constitute a source of hope.

In summary, it is currently up to us to show our people the road to real salvation. The duty to better acquaint the masses and the other democratic forces with our party's views on this matter and to transform these views into concrete strengths falls on our national conference. We do not claim that with our theses we are supplying the most correct answer to everything or that we foresee everything. On the contrary, we are creating a discussion platform with the widest-ranging forces.

Especially now, the creation of joint opinions and the exerting of joint efforts both inside and outside the party are of great importance. Therefore, all the comrades who discuss our policy with anyone outside the party must

advocate and discuss this policy with a flexible and tolerant, but at the same time determined, attitude. They must also be receptive to all correct views. The success of our conference undoubtedly depends on this.

On the other hand, it is vital for our national conference to obtain concrete and tangible results on all the fundamental issues we have raised. Among these issues are: securing the unity of broad-ranging democratic forces and the leftist forces; strengthening the masses' economic and political action; creating an anti-imperialist peace movement and a united mass democratic movement; and expanding and enhancing our party's circle of sympathizers. We also must take into account that the masses we must currently embrace are much larger than during the pre-12 September period. Our concepts of mass movement and mass organization must therefore change. In other words, we must develop the kind of work that embraces every progressive goal and that is devoid of any sectarianism. This point is particularly important for the youth, union, women, and intellectual movements. We must take our relations with our allies seriously and shoulder the responsibility of these relations. We must learn and teach how to work together. Our arguments must be convincing rather than [words indistinct] and crushing our opponent. We must have a patient and [word indistinct] policy of persuasion.

What is the current situation of our party? Is it strong enough to shoulder all the duties we have named? I do not hesitate to say yes. Our friends as well as our enemies are well aware that we exaggerate neither our strengths nor our capabilities. We are following the path of truth. While saying yes, I am bearing in mind all our weaknesses and shortcomings. One should, no doubt, thoroughly interpret our positive reply. What is the focus of our strength, which we shall increase during our conference? In other words, what kind of a stand shall we adopt, given the strength we possess?

We are trying to show the following points to the leftist forces outside our party: Democracy cannot be attained only through the strength of the working class and the left. No results can be achieved in this way. It is evident that the TCP cannot expect to achieve results only through its own strength. However, we can be very influential in securing the unity of the forces that can obtain results. We exert an influence on the conditions that will give way to a positive result.

There are three conditions for attaining this goal:

The first condition is that the TCP increase and strengthen the confidence of the masses and the democratic circles.

The second condition is that the TCP should be able to show to the masses and the other democratic forces that the country can be saved, that development can be achieved. The TCP at least should be able to show that the people's living conditions can be remarkably improved. It should be able to show that such goals are not illusions. The TCP should be able to instill optimism in these forces in order to stimulate them into action. We should thus instill a strong desire and determination for struggle. This is the revolutionary essence of our alternative program.

The third condition is to first create an organized movement--even if it is not widespread in the beginning--in all the dynamic sectors of the masses, namely the factories, the unions, and among the youth and the intellectuals, and to make use of all the legal possibilities in the most effective manner.

We now have the strength to meet all these three important conditions. I would like to recall that we do not claim to have attained our goal of a stronger TCP. We are currently in the initial stage. We will assess what our party has and has not achieved in the aftermath of its Fifth Congress. We can say the following at this time: The TCP has been part of all the actions taken since the 12 September coup. The TCP was not only part of these actions, but it also directed them. It not only gave advice but it actually initiated them. The Izmir rally and the 1986 May Day celebrations are significant examples. The same thing can be said about the actions taken outside Turkey. The reports sent by our organizations and, what is more important, the numerous letters we have received from our followers that show our party's influence prove this point. It is not a coincidence that after every important action the police and propaganda machines of the regime have chosen our party as the major target of their attacks.

I would also like to state that no force can disrupt the unity of our party. We have achieved our unity without resorting to a liquidation of opposition within the party, in the name of purification. Instead we have achieved it through patient dialogue and persuasion of comrades with different views. This demonstrates both to those inside and outside the TCP the true meaning of a party.

This is perhaps the first time I have stressed the achievements of our party. However, our party has continued on its struggle path without a day of interruption. This is the achievement of all our comrades and especially our comrades in [words indistinct]. I am now referring to your achievements, because during the conference I shall mercilessly criticize your shortcomings. At our national conference we will not stand before our working class and our people only with our views concerning the liberation of our country and the alternative program. We shall expose the achievements as well as the failures of our party. We want our people to have confidence in the TCP. However, we shall seek their trust and confidence not through demagogy but through concrete views and actions.

We shall give our last reply to those who are never content with the achievements of our party, the staunch TCP enemies and police efforts to portray our party as an organization seething with secret intrigues. We shall give our last reply to this shameless smear campaign against our party. This will be our last and final reply. Our party, which for years has been the target of the most barbaric and unimaginable assaults and smear campaigns, is the most democratic and open party in our country. We have confidence in our party and our party has confidence in its comrades. Our party members are proud of being under the roof of a reliable [word indistinct]. Our party's followers are increasing. Is the fascist dictatorship referring daily to our party in vain?

As a last word, we shall gain a policy [words indistinct] at our national conference. We have self-confidence because [words indistinct]. The democratic alternative which we have put forward strengthens our belief that our country can today enter the path of national and social liberation. We want to spread this belief to the masses. I believe tht our Central Committee, which will convene after the conference, will include on its agenda new and concrete revolutionary duties, that a new and clearer path will open before us, and that a considerable [words indistinct] in the goal of a democratic Turkey and a strong TCP. We wish all our comrades success in this [words indistinct] which has created a new revolutionary spirit.

First Installment of TCP Activity Report

TA2011145 (Clandestine) Voice of the Turkish Communist Party in Turkish
0400 GMT 30 May 86

[First installment of Political Bureau activity report read by Haydar Kutlu, secretary general of the Turkish Communist Party Central Committee, at the Central Committee Sixth Plenum; date and place not given--read by announcer]

[Text] Dear comrades. Nearly 6 months have elapsed since the Turkish Communist Party [TCP] Central Committee last met. This is not a long period. Nevertheless, it has been long enough to prove, through developments that have occurred, the complete justification of our party's evaluation, policies, and concrete stand. Moreover, the pace of developments during this period has accelerated. It appears that developments will accelerate even further.

Our party's determined policies are of a nature that can cope with such rapid change and can contend with new situations and events that emerge in every field of its political struggle. This fact is now clear. Currently the problem is to widely and actively disseminate our party's policies of democratic unity and determined struggle among the masses. Our prominent task today is to increase our efficiency in every field, to expand our party's activities among larger masses, and to make new achievements in our struggle to accomplish the unity of the broadest possible democratic forces.

It is in this spirit that our party is preparing for its national conference to be held in 1986. We have all the necessary conditions to transform our national conference into a very important springboard to attain our goal of a stronger TCP. The Sixth Plenum's task is to take the measures necessary to realize this potential.

International Situation

The dangerous tension in the international situation still prevails. There are signs of new intransigence in this situation. The reply of the U.S. military-industrial complex to the relatively successful Geneva summit between the U.S. and Soviet leaders, which has given all mankind hope for better times, has been to intensify its efforts to reach military supremacy over the socialist countries and to engage in extraordinarily aggressive acts

against the countries which refuse to bow to the U.S. impositions and want to preserve their independence.

The international situation has reached the point where the Reagan Administration can no longer conceal its aggressive aims behind its so-called peace-loving statements. U.S. imperialism is now pursuing the policy of proving its military might through the use of military force, trying in this way to impose its interests on the world's nations. U.S. imperialism is dreaming of regaining the positions it lost and is losing through its use of force. These dreams will lead nowhere, yet they represent great dangers for the fate of all mankind.

The United States is insisting on implementing its plans to militarize space. It has already received the agreement of the British and FRG imperialists for this initiative. The United States and NATO insist on not considering the peaceful proposals of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The U.S. administration is persistently continuing its nuclear tests. NATO is getting ready to store the new two-stage chemical weapons developed by the United States in Western Europe and Turkey.

In addition to increasing its pressures on Nicaragua, the United States has attacked Libya, bombing this country before the eyes of the entire world and completely exposing its true face. This brutal act carried out by the United States against the Libyan people without consideration for women or children has caused a strong reaction both internationally and among our country's people.

More and more people are now beginning to understand the reply to the questions of which side really wants peace, which side prefers war, and where the source of the war threat lies.

The program announced by Comrade Gorbachev on 15 January 1986 to free the world from nuclear weapons by the year 2000, the Soviet proposal to hold a summit meeting with the United States to discuss a ban on nuclear experiments, the proposal put forward at the 27th CPSU Congress on an international security system, the proposal made by Gorbachev in Berlin to significantly reduce the number of conventional weapons within the region stretching from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains--namely the entire European continent--and the Soviet proposals on a ban on chemical weapons, on the withdrawal of all foreign fleets from the Mediterranean, and on the solution of the Cyprus problem are indisputable proofs that the Soviet Union is a staunch supporter of peace.

This fundamental and reliable policy creates great opportunities for a peaceful future of our country, a close neighbor of the Soviet Union. A positive Turkish reply to the peaceful Soviet proposals and initiatives will greatly contribute to regional and world peace. The 27th Congress of the brotherly CPSU, this historic forum of the Soviet communists, is a strong indicator of the responsibility felt by the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the international communist and workers movement and the whole of humanity, as well as of its capacity to fulfill the duties stemming from this

responsibility. Our party has time and again stressed the importance of the 27th CPSU Congress. The TCP Central Committee Sixth Plenum, through a resolution informing our people of the significance of the 27th CPSU Congress and formulating the duties that befall us, will help us benefit from the opportunities the CPSU Congress has created for us.

The Foreign Political Situation and the Peace Struggle

U.S. imperialism, which is faced with world and U.S. reaction against the moves to escalate the arms race and its attacks on Libya, is preparing for new and more dangerous attacks. The United States is ready to launch new air raids on Nicaragua, Iran, Syria, and Libya. President Reagan has not hesitated to make these threats personally. The hawks of Washington have termed this policy "new globalism". They claim that this policy of "new globalism" aims at securing world peace and tranquility. However, in actuality this policy is tantamount to creating trouble for all peoples of the world and transforming our planet into a battlefield. The lesson to be learned is that the struggle for peace should be strengthened throughout the world.

This fact carries more importance for our country. U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger has clearly stated that Turkey is the focal point of many U.S. regional strategies. In U.S. plans, Turkey constitutes a bridge to war. [as heard] Dangerous developments confirming these facts, which we have been stressing from the very beginning, have occurred in recent months. Two U.S. battleships have crossed the straits on their way to the Black Sea and have violated Soviet territorial waters. What would the consequences be had the Soviet Union been as irresponsible as the United States? What would have happened to our country, which has 60 U.S. war bases with nuclear warheads? Every patriot should dwell on this issue at length.

Those who shamelessly exploit the Chernobyl nuclear power station accident, claiming that Turkey is covered with radioactive clouds, in order to serve their anti-Soviet campaign, are continually concealing from our people the danger posed by the U.S. bases. The United States insists on building 11 transmitters for its radio stations carrying anti-Soviet propaganda, and on deploying new chemical and nuclear weapons on our soil. The same determination is being shown with regard to obtaining logistic and deployment rights outside the NATO framework for the Rapid Deployment Force.

In addition to extending the Turkish-U.S. Defense Cooperation Agreement, secret negotiations are underway to sign an agreement entitled "Wartime Host Country Support". With this agreement, the United States wants to use our soil for the Rapid Deployment Force [RDF] and to secure the support of the Turkish armed forces for RDF attacks. The Evren-Ozal administration is ready to sign this agreement. The same willingness applies to the Defense Cooperation Agreement. The administration is waiting for the public reaction to subside.

Soon after the Libyan attack, President Reagan announced that the United States might attack our neighbors Iran and Syria as well. Speaking in

Bahrain, Vice President Bush said: In the event that we sense a danger in the region, we will immediately intervene militarily even if we are not requested to do so. The Evren-Ozal administration is indifferent to this stand which directly concerns our country. The same indifference was exhibited regarding the Libyan attack. The administration even extended aid to the United States. All these facts clearly show us that U.S. pressure on Turkey will increase and that Turkey may, at any moment, be dragged into a war because of the United States even if the Evren-Ozal administration is opposed to it.

The United Nations has declared 1986 the Year of Peace. It is currently more necessary and possible to strengthen the struggle for peace in our country. Every measure of oppression implemented by the dictatorship against the peace struggle will be a clear violation of the UN resolution. Every voice raised in favor of peace will, at the same time, strengthen the struggle for democracy.

These developments have proved, in a concrete manner, the reliability of our alternative program of foreign policy to meet our national interests. We have fulfilled a duty in proper time. Now we should spread our views and proposals further. The forces that may respond to us positively are increasing. Statements made by many circles show that their foreign policy concerns are similar to ours. A crushing majority of our community and all the opposition forces sided with Libya at the time of the U.S. attack. This shows that our views on the existence of forces in our country that can stop U.S. imperialism were not based on illusions, and that our people's anti-imperialist traditions are vivid. We should increase our effort to unite all these forces.

A narrow and limited approach to foreign policy problems by the opposition forces outside our party prevents them from becoming more active against the great danger on our doorstep. Nationalist [words indistinct] are tying the hands of many circles when it comes to taking a stand on the Cyprus problem, the Turkish-Greek conflict in the Aegean, the Syrian and Bulgarian issues, and the constructive and peaceful Soviet proposals. However, national interests can be secured only if national approaches can be transcended and security interests can be taken into consideration by all parties concerned.

The U.S. policy of "new globalism" can be countered through a collective security concept and through an unselfish approach, taking into consideration our security interests as well as those of all our neighbors. Only in this way can we prevent U.S. interference in Turkey's relations with its neighbors and the creation of new conflicts. Many circles adopted the correct stand regarding the Libyan issue. We believe that this stand should serve as an example for the other pending issues. However, one should not wait until the danger is at our doorstep, as was the case in the Libyan issue.

If the necessary pressure is applied on the Evren-Ozal administration, it can be prevented from extending the requested service to the United States. Therefore, all the democratic forces [words indistinct] in order to abolish the Defense Cooperation Agreement, to take control of the U.S. bases in our country, and not to sign any new agreement with the United States. The campaign against the U.S. bases should be stepped up.

Second Installment of TCP Activity Report

TA310955 (Clandestine) Voice of the Turkish Communist Party in Turkish
1400 GMT 31 May 86

[Second installment of Political Bureau activity report read by Haydar Kutlu, secretary general of the Turkish Communist Party Central Committee, at the Central Committee Sixth Plenum; date and place not given--read by announcer]

[Text] The Internal Political Situation

Dear comrades, although there has been a series of developments in the political life of our country, developments that should not be underestimated, there have been no qualitative changes in the regime. After the DISK officials, the officials of the Peace Association were released; the suspects in the intellectuals' case were acquitted; a large number of political prisoners were released as a result of the new law on the execution of sentences; the public speaking ban on former politicians was lifted; some policemen were sentenced for torturing prisoners; the Turkish Confederation of Labor was allowed to stage a rally; and legal press organs that defend progressive views are being allowed to expand their activities. These are important new developments and there are more that can be added to the list.

However, it would be a grave mistake to interpret these developments one-sidedly. These developments naturally show that the democratic forces have achieved important gains in issues about which they have waged a persistent struggle for a long time. These achievements increase the possibilities of the democratic forces. However, if you look carefully, you will see that none of these gains are guaranteed, that they can be taken back any minute, or at least neutralized.

Even though the possibilities of the democratic forces have increased, the maneuver [by the authorities--FBIS] to which we pointed a long time ago has supplied and is continuing to supply possibilities to the dictatorship as well. The dictatorship resorted to the maneuver of allowing the establishment of new parties and holding elections with a view to preventing serious opposition by the democratic forces. It assumed a civilian appearance on the one hand and regained, even if it is to a limited extent, the mass support it had lost by using the Motherland Party to confuse the masses, on the other. Thanks to this maneuver, the dictatorship prepared the ground for obtaining the support of Western European imperialism. In this way, the dictatorship is confusing the masses and ideologically influencing and guiding them through the civilian government, while retaining the 12 September mechanism of oppression and the possibilities of using it more harshly any time it wants. That is the situation today.

During the analysis of the political situation in our Fifth Plenum, we had determined that very broad opposition forces were united in opposing all the basic institutions of the existing regime and that the masses had reached a point where they were open to the idea of action. During the subsequent months, the Correct Way Party, the Democratic Left Party, the TCP, other

leftist forces, and the Prosperity Party posited the view of a national conciliation for a new constitution, the movement for an amnesty gained momentum, and important worker actions were carried out.

Evren, who is [words indistinct] the political isolation of the fascist dictatorship regime from the masses and from the democratic forces, has been forced to admit that he is the only one defending the dictatorship constitution today. However, because of the reason we mentioned earlier, the dictatorship has not become incapable of controlling developments, nor has it taken a permanent step back, even though it has suffered a political isolation. Therefore, it would be a mistake to ignore the danger that the dictatorship might toughen. The democratic struggle is developing, but this danger will increase unless the democratic forces unite and assume more determined positions.

The dictatorship, by using the means made possible by the maneuver, is trying to divide the democratic opposition, to prevent the masses from joining the political struggle and the mass movement from growing. When necessary, it is making the necessary obligatory compromises.

The aim of imperialism and of the collaborationist oligarchy is to protect the government positions they have gained, to ensure that Turkey plays the role assigned to it in U.S. military and political plans, and to maintain the 24 January economic policy so that the Turkish economy can be closely tied to the world capitalist centers in all aspects. They can make various other compromises in order to prevent a united democratic opposition, but it should be well understood that they will do all they can to prevent any developments that might create obstacles to their aims.

Obviously, democracy is an obstacle to them. The democracy yearned for by the people was not, is not, and never will be compatible with the military and political role assigned to Turkey by the U.S. military-and-industrial structure, with the approval of the British and West German imperialists, with the desire of the multinational monopolies to exploit Turkey to the end and maintain it as a backward and dependent country, with the habit of the Turkish monopolist bourgeoisie, which is always after gains without production and without investments, of exploiting the state resources, and making a profit of 1,000 to 1.

The democratic struggle cannot be successfully waged in Turkey, where imperialism is an internal factor, unless we can fully grasp the changes of the past years in the international situation, in the structure and attitude of the imperialist capital, and in the Turkish economy.

We would like to underline the fact that imperialism and the collaborationist bourgeoisie are as afraid of a wide bourgeois democracy in Turkey as they are of a revolution. Therefore, in order to stop the real processes toward democracy, they both resort to all kinds of tricks, and they retain all the possibilities to brutally crush these processes when necessary. Furthermore, they take sly steps in order to increase these possibilities and to reinforce the fascist institutionalization. The examples are not few. In recent

months, armed security units have been assigned to large private and state enterprises. When the efforts to arm certain persons against the people under the guise of village protectors in eastern Turkey did not yield the desired results, the authorities began to organize new official armed units for that purpose. Meanwhile, preparations are underway to allow the free sale of arms to supporters of the regime. Recently, the interior minister instructed the entire police force to take measures especially against the student and worker movements. Who can talk of democracy in a country where the police force is trained against the worker and student movements?

The latest examples are: the plainclothesmen during the Turkish Confederation of Labor rally in Izmir, the extraordinary police measures taken during that rally and on May Day with a view to frighten the people, and the inability of the Turkish Parliament to bear the name of May Day as "Workers Day".

Here, we must also point to the new election law. This law envisages a two-party regime. We believe that even those who fail to see how the state structure is being turned fascist, those who forget that the militarist generals have not abandoned their government positions, and those who think that because elections were held Turkey has moved toward democracy, even those people will realize, by merely looking at this law, that Turkey is not moving toward democracy, that one cannot move toward democracy in this way.

In response to the many-sized tactics undertaken by the imperialists and the collaborationist oligarchy to accord the dictatorship a democratic appearance by making certain concessions, one can witness two erroneous tendencies in addition to a correct tendency in the ranks of the democratic opposition. The correct tendency consists of insistently concentrating on the fundamental tasks of the struggle for democracy without being deceived by these tactics, enhancing the determination of the opposition, and supporting the struggle of the masses. As opposed to this, one of the wrong tendencies is leaving the door open to conciliation with the regime and the forces behind it, remaining indifferent to the basic tasks, and believing and expecting that a step-by-step transition to democracy is possible. The other wrong tendency consists of overlooking the new opportunities created by the dictatorship's tactics and not taking advantage of them.

All three tendencies, in our opinion, are present in all the ranks of the [word indistinct] of the democratic opposition. How did the correct trend present itself in the past period? We saw it in the following phenomena: the strengthening of the movement to stop torture, expose it, and bring the torturers to justice; the determined attitude adopted by many deputies of the Social Democratic Populist Party [SDPP] and CUMHURIYET, and the efforts these circles exerted in a bid to stop the pressures on the Kurdish people; the defense of May Day at the Assembly; the Izmir rally organized by Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor], the decision by its organization to hold new marches and meetings, and the announcement that a general strike will be held unless the government changes its stand; the strengthening of the idea of democratic unity with Turk-Is; the united stand of the Correct Way Party [CWP] and the Democratic Leftist Party [DLP] for new elections, a new constitution,

and a new president, and their open cooperation with other opposition forces for a new constitution; the Prosperity Party's support for this move; the SDPP proposal to hold early elections at several provincial and district congresses, and this party's consistent defense of democracy; the intensified anti-militarist moves by Suleyman Demirel and the CWP against the top-level Army administration; the recent overt expressions of concern regarding the MIT [National Intelligence Organization]; the argument by the Prosperity Party that in addition to Article 163, Articles 141 and 142 of the Penal Code must also be abolished; the expansion of the circles which react against our country's slave-like dependence on the United States; the intensification of the demands for peace; the support displayed by all the legal opposition parties for Libya in the face of the U.S. attack against that country, and their more sensitive attitude concerning the protection of our national interests against the United States; the joining of leftist forces broader than the forces comprising the Leftist Unity in an active campaign to secure a general political amnesty and to stop the tortures and the oppression of the Kurdish people; the recent petition submitted by lawyers; the signatures collected by artists against censorship; the intellectuals' determination to fulfill their tasks in the struggle for democracy in an organized and unified manner; the moves undertaken by the SDPP together with leftist intellectuals to defend democratic rights; the courageous moves by various organizations of intellectuals on the subject of democracy; the determination of democratic youths to use the right they obtained through unity to establish a student association for the purpose of resolving all students' common problems; and the emergence of an initiative by democratic women to protect women's rights.

The wrong tendencies, on the other hand, became apparent from the fact that the SDPP administration regards the existing constitution, parliament, and government as problems of an ordinary regime and acts accordingly; that the SDPP claims that it will be sufficient for it to come to power to solve the problems and it shuns early elections; that it does not join in the CWP and DLP initiative to amend the Constitution; that it leaves the door open to conciliation with militarist generals; that it attempts to cooperate with foreign capitalists and TUSIAD [Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association], and issues statements to this effect; that it asked the Social Democrats in the Council of Europe not to pressure the regime in Turkey; that, in practice, the DLP chooses the leftists and intellectuals that do not sympathize with it rather than the regime as a target of opposition; that the DLP remains indifferent in the face of basic issues such as the urgent problems raised by the masses in various actions and the struggle against tortures; that the DLP does not demonstrate an attitude consistent with its pronouncements regarding a wide-ranging democracy and freedom toward the TCP; that the CWP turns a blind eye to the oppression of the Kurdish people; that the CWP does not hesitate to make anti-communist statements against the TCP; that the Turk-Is administration expects the government to change its anti-worker attitude; that it is extremely slow and lax in implementing the decisions on action; that it does not adopt the problems of other toilers; that the legal socialist party forces [words indistinct] in the illegal leftist movement; that the tasks of intensifying the actions of the masses, spurring the mass organizations, and expanding the leftist influence in these

areas are not sufficiently fulfilled; that the legal socialist parties are satisfied with a policy that merely interprets events rather than insistently pursuing a political right to achieve democracy; that the majority of Turkish and Kurdish democratic forces continue to emphasize the points that separate them from other democratic forces more than those that unite them with these forces; and that certain leftist circles with legal publications adopt an attitude which minimizes the working class and its role in the democratic movement, which claims that we must wait for the progress of capitalism, which supports the idea of a leftist movement detached from the worker's movement, and which encourages anti-Sovietism.

The basic reason for the influence of these wrong trends on the democratic opposition is the fact that the current policy of the U.S. imperialists and the collaborationist oligarchy has not been fully understood and the belief that it is possible to attain democracy without struggling against this. There is a conviction that the image engendered by their tactics is the reality--that the regime has softened and that we will attain democracy gradually and easily. There are those who talk on the task of securing themselves a position rather than attaining democracy. They cannot see that it is impossible to secure a lasting position to serve the people without uniting in the struggle for democracy.

Third Installment of TCP Activity Report

TA021535 (Clandestine) Voice of the Turkish Communist Party in Turkish
1700 GMT 1 Jun 86

[Third installment of Political Bureau activity report read by Haydar Kutlu, secretary general of the Turkish Communist Party Central Committee, at the Central Committee Sixth Plenum; date and place not given--read by announcer]

[Text] In this past period, the TCP supported without preconditions and with all its means the healthy strengthening of the ranks of the democratic opposition. It tried to strengthen this movement by its own activities, and voiced the necessary criticism against all signs of wrong tendencies without compromising its constructive and unifying policy. It showed how these tendencies enable imperialism and the collaborationist oligarchy to maneuver and help them achieve their aim of dividing the democratic forces.

The Central Committee Fifth Plenum determined that the only way to strengthen the right movement in the democratic opposition and increase its determination is through enhancing the mass movement, and the plenum placed this duty before us. It also decided to carry out political campaigns to this end. That this policy was correct was specifically proven in this past period. This did not happen naturally; it happened as a result of the party organizations' activities in line with the policy determined by the Central Committee.

The Izmir rally is both educational and encouraging in many aspects. It revealed the great power that can emerge from labor unity, when it is achieved. The rally also reflected the developing consciousness of the working class. The tendency to restrict the rally within an economic

framework was eliminated, and the rally turned into a powerful political protest where the political as well as economic demands of the working class were voiced.

Even if there were a few mistakes, the TCP played a very active role, in line with the Fifth Plenum decisions, in uniting the differing political tendencies during the preparation and organization of the rally. If we look at the Izmir rally, we see very clearly that when the working class becomes active and carries out action with its own struggle methods, when the communists and their supporters, who pursue a policy that defends the unity of all the democratic forces and the interests of all the other toilers, increase their efforts, the dictatorship is pushed against the wall and is unable to hide its true face, and the tendency to wage a determined struggle gains strength in the ranks of the other democratic forces.

The strike of 3,500 state monopoly workers in Samsun, the workers' and their families' protest in Sungurlar, the strike of the train engineers in Ankara and Istanbul, and the march organized by unions in Balikesir were important acts of protest.

We can say that if we are able to fulfill the necessary requirements, this year's May Day will be the beginning of a new phase in the struggle for democracy, in that it was marked by phenomena, which are not related in practice, but which are actually closely interrelated through the numerous ties of the social position and role of the working class and the objective dialectic of the democratic struggle; by the May Day actions of the progressive sectors of the proletariat and its friends; by the Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor] decision to hold a series of strikes and a general strike; by the pronouncement of a leader of the Social Democratic Populist Party [SDPP] at the National Assembly, under attacks by Motherland Party [ANAP] and National Democracy Party [NDP] deputies, in favor of May Day as the international holiday of the workers; and by the increasing demands for a Turkey without prohibitions.

If we do fulfill the necessary requirements, if we, the other leftist forces, the consistent supporters of democracy, and the activists of mass organizations do fulfill the requirements, then it will be possible to achieve positive changes in the situation at a faster pace than one may think. Everyone now can better see that we are not talking nonsense when we say that hope lies with the working class. However, how should one interpret this statement and what should one do in line with it? In our opinion, the direction of our Fifth Plenum provides the answer to this question: To activate the progressive sectors of the working class and assist them in uniting all the toilers, regardless of their political views, in general democratic demands; to heighten the toilers' actions using all possible means; to support every democratic initiative without preconditions or dilemmas; to increase the influence of the working class and its organizations throughout the entire society in this manner; to secure and develop the cooperation of the democratic forces; and thus establish the democratic front step by step.

Our party organizations must carry out their campaigns within this framework. The efficiency of this path has already been proved. We determined this policy beginning with our Fifth Congress and developed and improved it in accordance with concrete developments. At that time, though there was nothing tangible on the matter, we expressed our conviction that the working class would play a constructive role in the struggle for democracy, that in addition to it, other forces would emerge in a bid to actively participate in that struggle, and that the policy of uniting all democratic forces should be given paramount importance. Various circles in the left claimed that we were dreaming.

As a result, we were subjected to much criticism and gross accusations. However, currently anybody who has the ability to analyze the situation without being sentimental can be convinced that our policies were justified. The political realities that only we declared in the past are now being voiced by much broader forces. While in the past we were struggling alone in line with the four chief goals determined at the Central Committee First Plenum, now we are working together with very wide-ranging forces.

However, here we must make a point. The ranks of those who accused us of not being revolutionary when in the past we pointed out that very broad-ranging forces can be activated in favor of democracy are now wrongly interpreting the fact that the forces we indicated are becoming active, and jumping to the conclusion that the nature of the regime has changed. This is the most dangerous error for the leftist forces. We would like to emphasize strongly that the fascist nature of the regime has not changed. It is impossible to speak of a change in the regime unless a process begins to develop whereby the deep-rooted changes introduced by the fascist dictatorship into the state structure are eliminated, the doctrine of becoming the satellite of the most aggressive imperialist forces is reversed, and this government, this constitution, and the existing fascist apparatus of oppression is replaced.

We are only at the beginning of the struggle to achieve democracy, and not at the end. Whoever believes that democracy or sound democratic positions can be attained without first securing the unity of the democratic forces, which are becoming increasingly active, enhancing the role of the working movement, that is now showing signs of activity, leading mass actions into an ever-increasing trend, creating a united, massive, and democratic movement, or closely uniting the Marxist left and enhancing its influence; in short without realizing a national resistance, is bound to receive again a severe blow in the future.

The TCP documents "The National Democratic Alternative" and "The National Democracy and the Armed Forces" programs which we submitted to the plenum for approval and which will be submitted to the party for discussion during the national conference process, formulate the TCP's fundamental views regarding the democratization of the state. We believe that these documents will greatly assist in increasing our political influence in the democratic struggle.

The Economic Situation

The real economic situation is sufficiently grave to cause anyone who loves his country and who feels even the slightest responsibility for the country's future to rebel. Exposing Ozal's lies on the basis of figures relating to inflation, rate of growth, paper money, balance of payments, unemployment, real wages, and profiteering by monopolies are no longer adequate to demonstrate the real importance of the situation.

Currently, the important thing is not only the terrible impoverishment and regression revealed by these figures. The real important issue consists of the future awaiting Turkey, the fact that industry and agriculture are being driven down the road to ruin. We are not exaggerating. Turkey is currently a country whose industry and agriculture are collapsing. Imperialist agents, who have infiltrated us and seized all the key positions in the economy and the state, are slyly but rapidly progressing on this road. They are destroying all the objective foundations of our national entity and national sovereignty piece by piece.

We advise those who claim that we are exaggerating to take a close look at the facts and the documents. The plan called the "Rehabilitation and Privatization of the Public Economic Enterprises" [KIT] prepared by one of the prominent U.S. monopolies--namely, the Morgan Guarantee Trust Company--has recently been announced. If this plan is adopted and implemented by the government the following will happen: Strategically important mines such as borax, industrial installations relating to telecommunications and to the production and transport of energy, industrial branches of a dynamic character, and the airlines will immediately be transferred to monopolies outside the country. The remaining mining installations, and the textile, fertilizer, and cement installations will be further developed by the state for a while longer and will then be transferred to foreign monopolies. The iron, steel, aluminum, and copper installations, the railways, the shipping industry, agricultural machinery factories, coal mines, and the sugar and tea factories will be left to disintegrate. The state will continue to administer services such as the posts, the ports, and the airports.

The picture is very clear. Heavy and machine tool industries will be destroyed. Turkey will become a country whose only means of transportation will be the highways, thus creating a dependency on oil alone, and whose air and maritime transport, energy, telecommunications, mines, and dynamic sectors will be in the hands of imperialism. Can such a country exist? Can an independent state exist within this framework? Can national development be achieved under these conditions? If we remain silent, imperialism will have no difficulty making the Evren-Ozal administration adopt these plans. Past experiences confirm this.

Now let us look at agriculture. Even the spokesmen of the Turkish Union of Chamber of Agriculture [TZOB], which is under the control of rich farmers and the agricultural capitalists, have, in recent months, repeatedly stated that Turkish agriculture is in danger. However, no one is paying any attention to these cries. On the contrary, the Ozal government is keeping the subsidies

low, decreasing the number of subsidized items, and gradually reducing state monopoly purchases. Agricultural loans are being reduced and the interest rates on these loans are being increased. Irrigation expenses are also being increased. The government has recently decided not to subsidize fertilizers and to be selective in its support of agricultural producers.

All these steps are not being initiated by the government. All these steps are IMF demands which appear in the World Bank protocol signed on 4 April 1984. The implementation of these imperialist demands began in 1985 and has since caused a continuous drop in agricultural production, which has become chronic since 1982. [as heard] The growth in agricultural production lags behind the population growth. This has resulted in the import of agricultural goods. We have become wheat importers.

Livestock breeding is on the decline. Small- and medium-sized breeders and even the rich ones are in a disastrous state. If this trend is not stopped our dependence on the outside world will spread to the agricultural sector as well. The picture is becoming complete. National industry is being destroyed. The mines and similar installations are being handed over to imperialism. Agricultural production is on the decline and, as a result, agriculture is actually being destroyed. This is the future of our country.

We should recall that our foreign debts are constantly increasing. The rate of this increase accelerated in 1984 and 1985. We should also recall that the share of short-term loans within our overall debts has considerably increased during the last 2 years. Given these conditions, it becomes clear that imperialism has every possibility to easily and speedily implement its dictates. Given the current picture, we cannot refrain from asking what the unions, the opposition parties, our intellectuals, and the various chambers and industrialists who do not stand to benefit from these developments are waiting for in order to adopt a decisive stand.

We believe that the economic and social policy alternative prepared by the TCP in light of all the above-mentioned facts constitutes a sound foundation that all the national [word indistinct], the patriotic forces, and all the forces which favor putting a stop to the current economic trends can agree upon. This foundation is a democratic statist policy. This policy, in accordance with the interests of the working class and the other toilers, is the socially enriched version of the statist policy which functioned positively in the past. We believe that this is the only realistic and applicable alternative in order to put a stop to the destruction of the country through the implementation of the 24 January decisions made by the IMF and TUSIAD [Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association--FBIS], to prevent the deterioration of the people's living conditions, and to realize a turn for the better. We believe that every individual who can grasp the meaning of the picture we have drawn will agree with us.

The Fundamental Guidelines to Further Activate the Mass Movement and the Mass Organizations and to Form a United Mass Democratic Movement

The campaigns adopted to strengthen the mass movement by the TCP Fifth Plenum should be conducted in an orderly manner. This, above all, is closely related to the further activation of our work within the mass organizations and the various branches of the mass movement in line with the party policies. The basic guidelines of these activities, the labor movement, the Izmir rally, and the subsequent Turk-Is chairmanship council decision on a series of strikes, as well as a general strike show that it is possible to activate Turk-Is in accordance with the interests and demands of the grassroots. Now everyone, including those who bluntly criticized us without even proposing a plausible alternative, can clearly see that our decision toward a unity with Turk-Is in chaotic 1981 was correct as well as productive.

The government has launched an assault against the workers and their unions. The bill on the abolition of indemnity payments, the abolition of the minimum wage, the employment of workers through public tenders by KIT, the extension of the practice to employ workers on contract, the setback in labor laws, the introduction of new wage systems to exploit and divide the workers, and the freezing of wage increases at 25 percent, which is below the inflation rate, are on the government agenda. Layoffs are continuing. The Turk-Is decision on a series of strikes and a general strike is directed against the government. The current duty of the democratic unionists, who defend the interests and rights of the grassroots, is to create the conditions for the implementation of this decision. To this end government interference in unions should be prevented. On the other hand, it is necessary to spread the idea of strikes and a general strike and to begin organizing the factories. One can establish general strike committees extending from worksites to unions.

The will for a series of strikes and a general strike is directly connected with the democratic struggle. Therefore, this decision should not only be supported by the workers but by the democrats as well and should be transformed into the will of the nation. We should also point out that we are referring to careful, meticulous, but determined preparations. The empirical process shows that despite its subjective intentions, the Turk-Is administration, when caught between the government attacks and the reaction of the grassroots to the regime, cannot prevent the activation of the confederation.

The policy to be pursued under the circumstances is not to let the criticisms against the conciliatory stand of Turk-Is in its relationship with the existing regime take priority, thus minimizing the importance of heightening the grassroots' reaction against the regime and to transform this reaction into a political rally for which the masses are ready.

The year 1986 is the year of collective wage agreements. It is obvious that in our country, where the average daily wage, which was \$5.30 in 1985, has currently dropped to \$2.00, a very tough struggle must be waged by the workers to improve this situation. Currently, the government, in the face of this increasing pressure from the working class, is not able to feel at ease. The extent to which the smallest demand by toilers in the workplace will be

defended will be important in the determination of the results of the approaching collective wage agreement talks.

This year is also the year when Turk-Is will hold its general congress. The outcome of this congress will determine the confederation's stand on various issues. This congress has all the chances of becoming the most important one in its annals. That is why it must be approached with extreme seriousness by all responsible trade unionists.

Developments in the last 6 years have clearly proved that Turk-Is policies, which have prevailed in that confederation since the day it was first founded, such as preserving labor peace, considering all trade union activities above political party considerations, caring for community calm and conciliation, and other similar views, have served the interests of only the bosses and not the workers themselves.

However, today the confederation will find a stronger opposition by worker masses to its policies of conducting a policy of conciliation with the government and the bosses. Currently, defending all trade union liberties is imperative. Choosing the option of the middle-way or conciliation will lead to concessions. The time is ripe for a new policy to reign in Turk-Is. This policy must be based on the principle of "rights not being granted but being taken"; and must be determined by a process in which the grassroots are the decisionmaking and implementing organ, providing unity for all workers and trade unions which pursue a constructive policy of unity of action. Such a policy must care for the demands of all other toilers as well and must serve to transform Turk-Is into an important institution in the struggle being waged for democracy and a future democratic Turkey.

No single political force can impose on Turk-Is today such a policy based on democratic trade unionism, before overcoming the obstacle presented by the fascist and pro-government trade unionists. Until the close cooperation of communist, leftist, and social democratic trade unionists is secured, and until constructive work aimed at the unity within the Turk-Is administration of the trade unionists who are not fascists or pro-government is implemented, the federation cannot be brought to the point where it can implement its current preeminent tasks.

The belief that all that is at stake is bringing trade unionists of a certain political view to power in the federation without the contribution of all trade unionists who are in favor of democracy will only undermine the unity of Turk-Is. Should such an objective be achieved, then this will greatly strengthen the general workers movement, will induce the Social Democratic People's Party [SDPP] to give up its dreams of communal conciliation and peace, and will prevent the SDPP from taking advantage of worker discontent and reaction only for its own interests.

The unity of trade unions is the backbone of the struggle in favor of democracy. That is why the unity of Turk-Is must be supported by all democratic forces. General issues like eliminating government attacks against workers and trade unions, the bringing to power of a government that will

solve the workers' and trade unions' democratic demands, and the drafting of a new constitution that will include these demands, are fundamental principles that will provide the unity of various broad forces within the trade union movement.

Congresses in the branches or headquarters of trade unions as well as in the Turk-Is federation must be the forums in which demands are determined, a new economic and social view is inculcated among the grassroots, and ways of realizing these demands and the policies to be pursued to this end are sought. Each congress must be transformed into a platform where preparations for a strike or general strike [passage indistinct].

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NEW OFFICERS SCHOOL CURRICULUM AIMS AT CREATING 'GENERALISTS'

Elective Technical Curriculum Available

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 8 May 86 p 16

[Article by Peter Bergen: "They Believe in God, King and Country"]

[Text] At one of Denmark's higher educational institutions all the students still believe in God, King and Country. Yes, they hold these ideals so high that they determined their choice of an education.

During the wage negotiations the officers organizations claim that young people today do not consider the job of an officer as a vocation. But among the students with which AKTUELT spoke at The Army Officers School, wages were definitely not foremost.

"Money is not everything," explained newly fledged First Lieutenant D. F. Severinsen, 28, who is father of a family and as such has at least a need for a reasonable wage.

"God, King and Country count more than wages." These words came unprovoked and naturally from one of the cadets, which is the correct title for the prospective officers. And the others agreed that these ideals had great importance for them.

Animals

Otherwise the cadets have the same background, appearance and manner as young people at other educational institutions. OK, they are all well-built and in fine physical condition. Otherwise they would not be in the school.

"Out in society" they encounter prejudice. When they are in uniform they "get the finger," and there are shouts of "animal" and "murderer" after them on the streets. But more often they encounter positive curiosity, and they do not take the negative reactions seriously. One said:

"I often find that people become rather amazed when, after a couple of hours conversation I tell them that I am a cadet. They say, 'You don't look

like it,' or 'I can't believe it.' There is a lot of ignorance about what we do, and also a lot of curiosity."

Blinkers

"I often hear comments about the uniform. But if you yourself are normal, people accept your work like any other. It depends entirely on how you yourself behave.

"Leftwing oriented people look at us as people who want war. But we actually work eight hours per day to prevent war. We try to explain that.

"I am willing to enter discussions. But it is not always possible to discuss. Some people have blinkers and are intolerant.

"It is important that we understand that the fear of war and nuclear weapons is real. And that it is not us they are criticizing, but the 'system.'

"It depends very much on the geography. In Jylland you do not encounter such a hard and bombastic tone as you do in Copenhagen."

A Challenge

The social background of the students largely corresponds to the national average. With one single but noteworthy exception: some, but still an absolute minority, are sons of officers or others involved in the military.

Most often they are among the youngest cadets. Such as E. Reese-Petersen, who has just finished the school and is a first lieutenant at only 22. They went into the military directly from junior college, and then into cadet candidate school. The great majority first felt the desire to be officers while they were serving as enlisted privates, or frequently as conscript sergeants. Or after being sent home.

"I studied to be a doctor, but I saw the health system as being too bureaucratic. The military is not, so I decided to become an officer," said T. Rosenquist.

The instructors at the school are pleased by such a background. They consider it an advantage if a student has tried something besides schools and barracks.

"A challenge" and the opportunity to come rapidly into a position of leadership are the usual reasons given by the cadets for having chosen the career of an officer. And also to participate in defending the country and democracy.

Leadership Training

"Ours is the only education which is aimed at training people to lead. And there are not many occupations in which people get such great responsibility so early," said the school's superintendent, Colonel Soren Haslund-Christensen.

The salary, about 13,000 kroner for a newly fledged first lieutenant, is not enough to induce anyone to become an officer. But perhaps that counts in considering that an officer does not have an educational debt to pay off. During the two and one-half years as a cadet their salary is 11,000 kroner per month.

Sports Officer

"Most of them are drawn to the soldier's life, the free life in nature and all that. But they discover that being an officer involves much more than that," said one of the instructors, Major Jan Ewald.

Many also come in hoping that they will be able to turn their great interest in sports into a profession. They must realize that there is no need for so many sports officers. And that in any case they must serve three or four years in the ranks before they can become sports officers.

Even though a so-called "unit officers" course has been introduced, the instructors instinctively classify some students as "troop officers" or "administrative officers." Some have the ability to lead people but are not much as administrators. Others are best behind a desk.

Generalists

The new training program, which has just produced the first group of first lieutenants, is intended to train "generalists," officers who can do anything. The principle is that all who pass the examination at Frederiksberg Castle have a chance to become generals. Privately the instructors evaluate which ones "will go far." Their evaluations of a man's possibilities of advancement usually are correct, they say.

Officers take specialist training later, according to their desires and abilities. And then the chances to become a general decline if, for example, one chooses to become a computer expert. On the other hand a computer officer can pick and choose among well-paying jobs outside the defense.

Colonel Haslund-Christensen said, "It is important for one to decide what he is good at, and then be trained accordingly. The system is much more flexible than before. To a greater extent, one can shape his own success."

Officer Career Attracting Youths

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 8 May 86 p 17

[Article by Peter Bergen: "More Youths Want To Be Officers--Only a Few Will Succeed"]

[Text] The troubles of the generations of '68 with the authorities have not left much of a mark on the attitude of the '80s toward the military. Willingness to defend the country is growing, and the Army Officers School can

pick and choose among applicants, of which there are more. This year there were 179, compared with 170 last year.

So before a young man or woman can call him- or herself a first lieutenant he or she must go through a lot of hardship.

As a rule only three percent of the cadets resign or are sorted out at the Army Officers School. Usually it is because they cannot meet the physical requirements. Before admission, however, two-thirds of the applicants are rejected.

Women have the most difficulty getting in, because they must meet the same physical requirements as the men. Of the 66 cadets who just completed the school, only 2 were women.

The entrance examination takes two days. Many fail the physical tests, but most fail because of the military-psychological evaluation consisting of interviews and tests. The school superintendent, Colonel Soren Haslund-Christensen calls the psychologists' test "the eye of the needle."

"The psychologists can determine whether the one with the high marks from his high school final examination has worn himself out getting them, and is burned out and without imagination: there may be nothing left in him. While one with poor marks may have since had different jobs, participated in sports, travelled abroad, and is now mature and goal oriented."

To enter officer school one must have been a sergeant. The reports on how that turned out are of course very important. Some sergeants are found to be so well qualified that they are invited to apply for officers school.

"We look for talent in the ranks, that is where the best officers come from. They are often people who have not thought about becoming officers," said Haslund-Christensen.

He summed up: "One should be among the top third of the sergeants. He should have a good physique, be able to study, meaning he should be able to understand theory and put it into practice, and be able to analyze and reach decisions. And he should have leadership potential--a natural ability to get others to carry out his wishes. Among the 178 applicants, perhaps 60-75 are good enough."

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DEFENSE COMMISSION ENVISIONS PARTIAL RENEWAL OF MATERIEL

Personnel Problems Also Addressed

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 26 Apr 86 p 13

[Article by j-ae: "'Compensate For the Lag' Considerable Budget Increase Suggested for Defense"]

[Text] In its report on the armed forces' action and economics plans for 1987-91, the Parliamentary Defense Commission talks about a return to a strict application of the recommendations made by the Third Parliamentary Defense Committee. This means not only a continued, comparatively high budget growth but also compensation for the shortfall which occurred during the current five-year period.

The Commission states, in its report, that the appropriation for the procurement of materiel was less than suggested by the defense Committee during 1982-86. Therefore, it was not possible to make procurements to the intended extent. At the same time, a great part of the procurement budget must be used to compensate for the increased cost of technology.

According to studies made by the General Staff, prices of defense materiel have increased on an average 5 percent faster than the general cost index. The Third Parliamentary Defense Committee estimated this increase at only 2 percent and it suggested that the defense budget should have a real increase of 3.8 percent annually.

Consequently, all shortages could not be corrected in the manner suggested by the Defense Committee. Important projects have not been realized or have been delayed. For instance, the development of the so-called protective forces has not occurred as planned.

The recommendations of the Defense Committee have only been met as far as salary, management, and maintenance budgets are concerned, and those have even been exceeded.

The Parliamentary Defense Commission now wants to continue to apply the recommendations of the Defense Committee, which means special emphasis on the landforces and the protective forces during 1987-91.

On the basis of existing studies, the Commission has established that a real annual budget increase of 3.8 percent is not sufficient to reach the goals approved by the Defense Committee, during 1987-91. This is due, among other things, to the shortfall and the increased technological cost of materiel.

The conclusion then is that the defense budget during 1987-91 should not only continue to be increased by 3.8 percent per annum, but it should also compensate for the shortfall during 1982-86.

Among other things, the Commission suggests further that the benefits for enlisted men should be improved in accordance with earlier objectives. The daily rate of pay must be increased and the system of free trips enlarged.

The Parliamentary Defense Commission also finds fault with the lack of personnel in defense, which affects instruction in as well as utilization of the materiel.

The Commission emphasizes the fact that procurement in the future should be tied to personnel reserves as far as operation and maintenance are concerned.

At the present time, the Defense Department is preparing a change in the regulations concerning military service age, so that a force of 31,000 men can be maintained annually despite the reduction of the age groups.

The Defense Commission considers it important to increase the number of men being recalled for reserve exercises by 3,000 annually. The report also mentions that the reserve exercises ought to be extended by two days.

No Cost Calculations

The Parliamentary Defense Commission does not give any estimate of how much money will be gobbled up by its recommendations if they are followed to the letter. Its chairman, former under-Secretary of State, Matti Tuovinen, says, "That was not the task of the Commission." In any event, it is obvious that there would be a considerable budget increase.

In reality it was mainly the representatives for the Social Democrats who expressly opposed exact figures and calculations. They did not want to tie the government's hands in any way.

Colonel Antero Karvinen, who acted as secretary on the Commission, said yesterday that, according to the calculations of the General staff, the shortfall in materiel amounts to over 700 million markkas. Overall it may be a question of several billion markkas. There are two alternatives in the suggested action and economics plan for 1987-91 reported on by the Commission, a basic plan and a development plan. The basic plan, on the whole, follows the 3.8 percent recommendation, the development plan would mean a real increase in the defense budget of 6.2 percent per annum.

The general feeling yesterday was that the Commission's recommendation indicate that the development plan level is being reached.

The basic plan would make possible a partial renewal of materiel and a slow expansion of the protective forces. The development plan would facilitate improvements in the materiel situation and an earlier realization of the plans for the protective forces.

One Reservation

The Commission was unanimous in its recommendations. There was no voting, but Jorma Hentila, member of the People's Democratic League (SKOL) added a reservation to the report. Hentila is of the opinion that a solution ought to have been found that would prevent defense expenses from increasing more than the average budget expenses. The Finance Ministry estimates that the expenses of the State can have an average annual increase of only 1.5 percent during 1987-91.

In his reservation, Hentila maintains that the Commission based its recommendations on obviously unrealistic economic and political judgments. "Among other things, the Commission paints a positively "rosy" picture of the eventual use of nuclear weapons," says Hentila. According to him, the risk for the future use of nuclear weapons has increased.

He maintains further that Finland, on the whole, cannot afford to build up a system that can defend effectively against the threat of cruise missiles. Political, not military, actions are needed for that.

The Parliamentary Defense Commission is headed by the former under-Secretary of State, Matti Tuovinen (Center Party). Vice-chairman was Pekka Myllyniemi (Social Democrat), member of parliament, and members were Antti Kalliomake (Social Democrat), member of parliament, Vice-Chairman Tapani Morttinen (Conservative Party), Editor-in Chief Jorma Hentila (SKOL) and Party Secretary Peter Stenlund (Swedish People's Party).

Consensus, Authoritativeness Elude Commission

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET In Swedish 27 Apr 86 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson: "Cautiously but Unanimously"]

Jan-Magnus Jansson writes that the report from the Defense Commission is cautious in its wording about the outlook for defense during the next five-year period, but unanimous except for the representative of the SKOL. The fact that the Commission has not defined the figures exactly is a weakness, but it is due to their wish for the largest possible consensus.

[Text] As mentioned in the HUFVUDSTADSBLADET yesterday, the Defense Commission convened Parliament, has rendered an opinion about the trends

of defense during 1987-91. The basis for the opinion is the action and economics plan that applies to the administrative sector of the Defense Department for the same period.

The opinion is unanimous except for the member of the SKOL, Jorma Hentila, who added a reservation. The Commission has aimed for the same broad consensus that characterized the Parliamentary Defense Committees during 1970-81. Unfortunately, it has become more and more difficult to get the consensus to include the members of the SKOL. Remember that the SKOL had to leave the government in 1982 just because of a question about defense spending. It can be stated, however, that unity between the non-Socialist parties and the Social Democrats is necessary in order to give the recommendations sufficient political strength. Political unity in its turn takes its toll in the form of compromises.

The defense planning during the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's were based, to a great extent, on the work of the three Defense Committees. During the spring of 1985, when the government decided not to appoint a fourth Committee, but instead created a smaller Commission (which on the other hand has a mandate without time limit), there were fears that the Commission's assignment was too limited and that the broad-based planning done by the Defense Committees now was at an end. There can be no final judgment in the matter, until it can be seen what authority the now rendered opinion has. In its structure, the Defense Commission's statement is reminiscent of those of the earlier Defense Committees. It is, in many ways, a question of follow-up on the work done by the Third Parliamentary Defense Committee (PFK III) at the beginning of the 1980's.

One point in particular indicates that the mandate of the Commission is fairly limited. The detailed overview of the international situation that used to introduce the reports of the Defense Committees are missing. This is obviously because the writing of such an overview was not part of its mandate.

The lack of an evaluation of the international situation would constitute a serious omission, if the international situation, since 1981, had undergone such changes that a radical defense-political re-evaluation would have been necessary. Properly speaking, it can be stated that the international situation shows many facets that did not exist five years ago, but it is reasonable, at the same time, to agree with the Commission's comment that the situation, in the case of Finland's security policy, "does not give rise to new conclusions." On the contrary, Finland's situation in the 1980's has been surprisingly stable and that should, of course, be reflected in our security policy.

Finland's stable situation, however, has not prevented a certain political turmoil from arising even in our immediate surroundings. This is also remarked upon in the Commission's report. It notes--almost in a reporting manner--the idea that the military-political significance of Northern Europe is increasing. The references to Sweden have been modified to a certain degree. Like all earlier defense reports, the present report maintains

that Sweden's freedom from alliances and neutrality, "combined with a strong and credible defense ability" have a stabilizing significance for Finland and all of the North. At the same time, however, the report makes references to views in Swedish discussions indicating that future military interest will touch on Sweden more than before, and notice was also made of a new report about the sensitive position of Southern Sweden between the military blocks. This brings to mind the notable speech made by Vice-Admiral Klenberg, chief of the General staff, about the situation in the Baltic in 1984.

Otherwise the news is scanty. It may be due to the limited mandate of the Commission that it does not add to the report of PFK III in the controversial question of Finland and a nuclear war. The report is also reticent in the case of cruise missiles, but it does state that if cruise missiles are also provided with conventional warheads for tactical purposes, the demands on air defense will be made more stringent.

A noticable new feature is the references to terrorism and sabotage, concepts that did not figure in earlier defense reports.

A broader question is whether our defense doctrine has been visibly influenced by the thoughts about a so-called crisis management put forth by the commander of the defensive forces, Jaakko Valtanen, in his speech to the Paasikivi Society at the beginning of 1984. One response could be that the thought of a crisis situation "under war level," being more probable than open warfare, has long been part of the defense planning and was clearly defined in the report by PFK II in 1976. This almost sacred text has since been repeated in various connections and is also a part of the present report. In any case, it would be important to specify more clearly how the "crisis management" affects our defense thinking.

Concerning the acquisition of materiel and other development on the part of the Defense Department, the Defense Commission bases its report, to a conclusive degree, on the recommendations of PFK and on the action and economics plan of the Defense Department. Here we will only note the recommendations that concern the total budget and materiel acquisitions and bypass the otherwise important questions regarding the administration of the defensive forces, the instruction and the servicemen's situation.

In regard to the implementing recommendations of PFK III for the period 1982-86, the report notes that a shortfall exists and that has led to the fact that the so-called protective troops within the ground forces have not been equipped according to plan. Since the Commission states that the defense budget during the period was higher than recommended by the Committee, as far as money is concerned, the lag is due to the fact that certain conditions for PFK's calculations have been altered. This applies, first of all, to the so-called technological cost increase in war materiel. The Committee calculated that it would increase 2 percent faster per year than the general cost of living, while it is now considered to be closer to 5 percent.

In regard to materiel acquisitions, PFK III, in its report, presented a longterm plan for the development of defense during a 15-year period. However, there were only figures for the years 1982-86. The task of the Defense Commission has now been to determine the concrete budget decisions for the years 1987-91.

It has been working with two alternatives, prepared by the Defense Department, the so-called basic plan and the so-called development plan. The latter, considered satisfactory by the military experts, is working with a real budget increase of 6.2 percent per year--undeniably a large figure from a budget standpoint. The basic plan, a kind of minimum plan, works with the growth figure of 3.8 percent per year, introduced by PFK III. Both plans stress the development of ground forces, referring to the renovation that will later become necessary within the aerial forces in the middle of the 1990's.

In contrast to the Parliamentary Defense Committees, the Defense Commission, in its report, has not tried to make its own policy, nor tried to put figures on its cost suggestions, which is mainly due to a wish for a consensus. The Social Democrats have opposed precise figures which would be controversial within the party.

The Commission, however, has laid down certain general rules. It includes the suggestions of PFK III, but urges that the lag in the previous period be compensated for, and that the increase in technological costs be covered "completely" beyond the 3.8 percent annual real increase that the Committee recommended in its time.

The caution with regard to actual figures leaves the deciding authorities, in the last instance the government, with a fairly free hand. This is balanced by the agreement about the report, provided that it measures up to practical politics. If the, so far, long-term defense planning is subverted, our whole defense policy could become a flop (see picture) and that would be intolerable. Our situation and our commitments are exactly the same as they have always been.

12339/9190

CSO: 3650/199

STRIL 90 ANTIAIRCRAFT SYSTEM PROVIDES NEW RADAR CHAINS

Stockholm VART FORSVAR in Swedish No 1, Feb 86 pp 5-6

[Article by Lt Col Mats Bjorling, chief of the Tactical and Air Defense Department of the Air Force Staff: "STRIL 90: Important to Entire Total Defense System"; first paragraph is VART FORSVAR introduction]

[Text] In the debate over the future shape of our defense, very considerable interest has been shown in the issue of antisubmarine defense and in the JAS system over the past few years. This is understandable, considering the submarine incidents and the importance of the JAS project to Swedish security policy. But there is some danger that other components will be pushed into the background. One such component, a very important link in total defense, is the Tactical and Air Defense Control (STRIL) System.

The STRIL System of the future is called STRIL 90. It is not an entirely new system, as STRIL 60 once was, but a further development of the old system with partly new centers and all-new radar chains.

The STRIL System's missions remain unchanged. They are the following:

1. Providing the early warning and control needed by the interceptor units.
2. Air surveillance.
3. Monitoring of other aviation systems.
4. Control of general alerts.
5. Command of antiaircraft defenses.
6. Air raid warning radio network (LUFOR).
7. Ordering base alerts.

In addition to those wartime missions, the STRIL System has extensive missions in peacetime as regards early warning and combat information in connection with incident preparedness.

Threat Picture

The threat environment in which the STRIL system will operate in the 1990's is decisive as far as the system's design is concerned. The views expressed by the Air Force commander in chief in OB-85 [1985 Report by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces] can be taken as a basic description of that threat. Here is a quotation from page 175:

"In recent years, the big powers have sharply increased their capability for offensive aerial warfare and the transport of airborne troops and materiel. New aircraft and helicopters with considerably greater carrying capacity and range than older types are being introduced. Target acquisition systems, target analysis systems, and sighting systems are growing increasingly advanced with the growing use of modern electronics for signal processing, computing, visual displays, and so on. Airborne weapons against pinpoint targets are very accurate. Weapons against surface targets, including in some cases even hardened targets, are effective in covering large areas. Air operations are becoming less dependent on weather and visibility conditions as guidance systems, target acquisition systems, homing systems, and so on continue to be developed.

"The number of flight formations intended for offensive warfare has increased, especially in the East. For the most part, that increase has been brought about by assigning offensive missions to units formerly intended for defense.

"In the event of war, an aggressor's Air Force and airborne landing capability will constitute a very serious threat to us. Our population and civilian infrastructure will be in danger of serious injury and damage, our total defense system's fixed installations will become attractive targets, our mobilization efforts may be combated by air raids and attacks by troops dropped from the air, and our command organization will constitute an important target, as will our combat forces on land, at sea, and in the air."

Strong Air Defense

One conclusion which must be drawn from the threat picture described above is that it is more important than ever for Sweden to have a strong air defense.

Our ability to meet that threat requires active air defense components such as interceptor aircraft and antiaircraft defenses. In this connection, the interceptor units constitute the most important component because of their agility in the air, where they can muster strength quickly and use high firepower.

High quality in the fighter plane system is necessary to ensure success in air duels. But it is equally important that there be enough aircraft to cover the entire length of our long country and to ensure that they can hold out.

The STRIL System must also be so designed and balanced that it can carry out its missions all over the country both initially and after fighting has started. The system's qualities must include endurance and flexibility.

Technological developments have resulted in greatly increased possibilities for the early detection and monitoring of movements in the air. The early detection of surprise attacks that is made possible by radar technology is of great importance, not only because of the opportunity it provides to mobilize defense resources and meet the attack but also because the civil defense organization and the civilian population can be given earlier warning.

Construction of the STRIL 90 System has already begun. We have progressed farthest in connection with high-level radar. Construction of the chain using the PS-860 is almost complete. The radar station performs very well even in a jammed environment and has a range of 180 miles. It can also be protected from attack.

To ensure low-level coverage, a similar chain using the PS-870 low-level radar is being procured. This station can also resist jamming and withstand attacks. It has a range of 60 miles.

But the biggest future project is STRIL-C 90, which calls for converting the equipment in our STRIL centers. In STRIL-C 90, command will be exercised functionally through a command unit (LE) and a combat information unit (SE).

Overall Command

The LE will exercise overall command over the STRIL and interceptor units assigned to its sector. There will also be some degree of command over other flight formations and antiaircraft defense units. The sector's informational missions in the form of LUFOR transmissions, the transmission of orders to antiaircraft units, sector reporting, and activities in connection with alerts are handled by the LE.

The SE is responsible for combat information, target tracking, air traffic control, and optical aircraft reporting.

STRIL centers with varying tactical capabilities can be set up through various combinations of the LE and SE modules. The project includes all LE and SE equipment as well as activities in the centers for data processing, displays, and liaison.

Compared to STRID 60, STRID 90 will mean lower operating and maintenance costs, chiefly as a result of reorganized peacetime activity. The number of installations in simultaneous use for peacetime production and incident preparedness will be minimized. As one means of ensuring low lifetime operating costs, an effort is being made to procure uniform equipment of the modular type, preferably of a standard civilian type that requires little in the way of maintenance. Property in the form of fixed installations will be utilized to a very large extent.

The system of ground-based radar stations for low-level coverage has limited range and provides inadequate early warning times. The reason is that since radio waves travel in straight lines, radar's coverage of targets on the ground or of low-flying aircraft is generally limited to the horizon by the

curvature of the earth. To increase ranges, therefore, it is advantageous to place radar on aircraft for surveillance from high altitudes.

The FMV [Defense Materiel Administration] is working to develop an airborne radar that can be used for air and sea surveillance as well as some degree of ground surveillance. That radar, designated PS-890, will considerably improve our low-level coverage and endurance. Since the system will be airborne, it will be flexible and can quickly be put into use where most needed.

The system in question consists of a small turboprop plane with a rectangular top-mounted antenna. The antenna will be controlled electronically, meaning that a wide sector across the flight path can be scanned. The radar will act as a sensor for the regular STRIL System, to which the data will be sent for further processing and compilation along with other data.

The STRIL System will also be rounded out with passive measuring systems. The old optical aircraft warning system will be retained and modernized.

OB Level Necessary

The design of STRIL 90 as described above is included in current plans as part of the OB-85 program planning level and higher planning levels. It is necessary that at least that level be achieved if the STRIL System is to fulfill its missions satisfactorily.

For an aggressor, it would probably be necessary initially to limit the effect of our air defense. If the aggressor considers it necessary to attack the STRIL System to reduce the effect of our air defense, he will attempt to do so. Reducing the STRIL System's effect will mean poor surveillance and control in our airspace, with the result that the aggressor will lose fewer aircraft. If the effect of our air defense is reduced, the aggressor will also have greater opportunities for using his Air Force freely.

No Early Warning

Reducing the STRIL System's effect will also mean that the army's combat forces and the civilian population will not receive advance warning when they need it most. And the total defense organization will then have to operate under continuous pressure from the air and without advance warning. The consequences are obvious. We can mention the following as examples:

1. How will the army units plan and carry out their regroupings without the air raid warning radio network?
2. How will the civilian population be alerted if the situation in the air is not known? Will the population be forced to spend very long periods in the air raid shelters?
3. Will we dare continue important wartime production when we are in constant danger of an attack without warning?

The STRIL System is very important to total defense. The ability to command flight formations and antiaircraft units in an optimal manner may be crucial to the outcome of an attack on our country. A strong concentration on the STRIL System therefore appears very important, considering that in addition to its responsibility for controlling fighter aircraft and antiaircraft units, the need to protect the fighting forces and the population by providing early warning will continue unabated.

11798

CSO: 3650/216

HOME GUARD EXPANDS MISSION, IMPROVES EQUIPMENT

Stockholm HEMVARNET in Swedish No 2, Apr 86 pp 6-7

[Article by Lt Col Lars Wanrud, personnel chief of the National Home Guard Staff: "Innovations in the Home Guard Over the Past 2 Years"]

[Text] Before I describe a number of changes, I consider it very important to point out that the changes which have been made and those which may be made in the future are based on the long-standing truths concerning the Home Guard:

1. The organization makes defense everyone's business.
2. The will to resist is strengthened and made visible both here and abroad.
3. The credibility of our defense policy is strengthened.
4. The organization has a social function in society.

But the crucial element in the Home Guard and the one which must determine its dimensions is the fact that it is a wartime organization with wartime missions that must be carried out immediately and with the greatest possible effect.

Who Determines Requirements?

It is the opponent, not the OB [supreme commander of the Armed Forces], the CA [Army commander in chief], or the chief of the National Home Guard, who determines requirements.

It is the opponent's training, equipment, tactics, and objective which determine what the Home Guard must be able to do. When the Home Guard was established, its job was to stand behind a partially mobilized army. Today it must join in and take the first thrust. It will probably not be completely alone even at the start, but in most places it will still have to cope with sabotage units, diversionary units, and perhaps raiding operations. To ensure that its units are able to engage in armed action and so on, the Home Guard should not operate with units of less than half a platoon. That requirement has made it necessary to overhaul both the Home Guard's wartime organization and its missions.

The Home Guard's wartime missions must be given priority. The number of half platoons that a Home Guard district can raise determines how many wartime missions can be assigned to that district.

An overhaul of the Home Guard's wartime organization is underway in many parts of the country. One reason is that we have too many small Home Guard districts, meaning that a large number of people are used in noncombat posts.

Home Guard Must Be Able To Operate for Longer Period

After the Home Guard goes on alert, our staffs will probably have to operate for a longer period, at least to provide relief men. If the actual alarm follows, everyone will naturally be on duty immediately. Those in areas where acts of war occur will probably stay on duty until the war is over. And even in areas where acts of war are not taking place, the Home Guard will probably have to remain on duty for a long time to defend important targets or improve its own fieldworks. The idea that members of the Home Guard will complete their missions in 3 or 4 days and then be able to return to their civilian occupations no longer applies. They may be required for a week, 10 days, or a month—it is hard to say, since the situation will probably differ in different parts of the country.

One consequence of the above is that the Home Guard must have maintenance and staff organizations that can function for a longer time. It also means that the Home Guard's B personnel must be able to serve longer. One result may be that the difference between volunteer organizations of A and B personnel will no longer exist. The demands placed on Home Guard units and the opponents they may face in today's conditions may place B personnel in a more exposed situation than A personnel, most of whom will be in concrete shelters.

Unit Exercises

The Home Guard has been holding unit exercises for the past couple of years.

It follows from what I said above that a Home Guard unit must be trained as a unit, and the result has been unit exercises. They must continue long enough to ensure that the problems really do arise. An exercise lasting 6 or 8 hours places no demands on the maintenance crews, and an exercise that begins at 0800 hours and ends at 1400 hours places no demands on billeting. There are other aspects as well. A unit exercise ought to last 24 hours or longer. And it need not be concerned the entire time with the target the Home Guard is defending. A lot of other things can be included in a 24-hour exercise.

Special exercises within the main exercise must be organized for maintenance personnel and others.

People have wondered how that fits in with the stipulations in the contract. The answer is that a home guardsman's contract stipulates a minimum of 20 hours and a maximum of 50 hours.

The volunteer organizations have already taken that into account, and it is to be hoped that the rules for home guardsmen and volunteer personnel will become the same when the FRIVT is rewritten.

Home Guard NCO Quality Considerably Improved

Many Home Guard commanders and local Home Guard commanders have not received training appropriate to their positions. When I say appropriate training, I am referring to the relevant courses at the HVSS [Home Guard Combat School]. To improve the situation, the rule since 1 January 1986 has been that NCO's appointed after 10 October 1984 cannot receive a commission. The purpose is to encourage greater participation in courses. Perhaps we should stipulate in the future that the appropriate course must be completed before a person can be appointed to a post. Another measure aimed at raising the proficiency level among our local Home Guard commanders and equipping them better to work on the staffs of defense district groups was the introduction of advanced courses for local Home Guard commanders in the fall of 1984.

Seven students have completed the course, and another 18 are currently being trained. The Home Guard courses are necessary, but to a greater extent than before, we must also see to it that Home Guard NCO's have a foundation in military command training.

Home Guard's Equipment Being Improved

Besides illumination for nighttime combat, weapons for B personnel and AK-4's for all home guardsmen may represent the most important equipment needs at the moment. Concerning the first-named need--weapons for B personnel--I have nothing new to report. The question of training and weapons for B personnel is being handled by Defense Staff/SAMFRIV. Experimental courses will probably be organized this summer. Weapons are not available, and because of the prevailing economic climate, new production will probably be delayed.

The Home Guard will be supplied with AK-4's under a special plan. All permanent home guardsmen in the general Home Guard and the industrial civil defense corps will be equipped with AK-4's in 1992.

By their own choice, members of the general Home Guard are obliged to serve in the Home Guard to carry out the four following missions:

1. Guard duty in connection with activity covered by the IKFN Regulation.
2. Guard duty at military restricted installations.
3. Rescue missions.
4. Search missions.

To make it possible to quickly deploy a force for those missions, many defense districts are currently organizing such forces. At the same time, several districts have decided to organize a platoon force at the local district

level. Individuals joining that force sign a special contract and are given special training that includes testing them as guards.

Home Guard With Naval Duties

In defense districts on the coast, personnel are being recruited to form Home Guard sections with naval duties. Boat sections, radar sections, optical surveillance sections, mine sections, command sections, KA (Coast Artillery) sections, and others are being organized, with varying degrees of progress being made in the various defense districts. Some sort of activity is underway all along the Swedish coast.

Inspections by National Home Guard Commander

The former inspections of training and equipment have been replaced by what are now called inspections by the commander. Finances have made it necessary to limit inspection activity, with the result that the two former types of inspection have been combined into one.

The purpose of those inspections is to inspect the Home Guard's preparedness, wartime planning, training, materiel services, and personnel services. In practice, such an inspection may take the form of observation by the national Home Guard commander of a unit exercise--an exercise that would have been held in ~~any case~~ or of a visit to Home Guard districts when an exercise is not taking place. During those visits, the national Home Guard commander wants to meet with the local ~~commander~~, the deputy commander, the adjutant, and the leaders of the kitchen and ~~medical~~ sections. On all visits, the Home Guard stores are inspected, the combat ~~plans~~ are studied, and each leader reports briefly on his area of responsibility. The ~~desire~~ of the national Home Guard commander is to visit as many districts as possible, but because of time constraints, some areas must be content with visits by representatives from his staff.

11798

CSO: 3650/214

GNP GROWTH OF 3.8 PERCENT FOR 1985 SURPRISES ECONOMISTS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 9-15 May 86 p 2

[Article by Frede Vestergaard: "Danish Economy Boomed in 1985--Happy 60's Again"; first paragraph is BERLINGSKE AFTEN introduction]

[Text] There was much more boom in the Danish economy last year than was assumed before one week ago. Private consumption was greatly underestimated by Denmark's Statistics.

Last week Denmark's Statistics rather inconspicuously published some statistics which are worthy of attention.

They were figures for production, income, consumption and investment in 1985. One could call it the Danish nation's tax return.

What is noteworthy about the figures is that they show that 1985 was a much better year than the statisticians, and thereby also the civil servants who advise the government on economic policy, have thought so far.

The numerical growth of Denmark's GNP last year was 3.8 percent.

With "advance accounting," a couple of days before the new year, Denmark's Statistics estimated a growth of 2.5 percent, which was rather nice, but far from the factual figure. The GNP would prove to be 7.5 billion kroner greater than first calculated.

If one looks closer at the figures to see how the statisticians were deceived, there are immediately two elements which were underestimated.

One was the growth in public consumption, which did not grow by 1.0 percent as assumed in December, but by 1.7 percent. The other was growth in private consumption, which was 4.3 percent in 1985 (compared with 2.7 percent in 1984) and not 2.5 percent as estimated in December.

Both figures are noteworthy. Growth in public consumption of 1.7 percent, after a decline of 0.8 percent in 1983 and 0.7 percent in 1984, shows that the government and the Radicals were not able to maintain their goal of zero growth in public expenditures. It is possible that there were savings in

certain areas, but they were more than offset by the growth in other areas. According to what WEEKENDAVISEN has learned, the entire growth was in the municipalities, while the state maintained zero growth.

The growth in private consumption is noteworthy in the light of the detailed business index through 1985 showing much less growth. Actually only a growth of one percent from 1984 to 1985. It is rather certain that new cars (which are not included in the detailed business index) made up more than one-fourth of the growth of consumption of 9.3 billion kroner from 1984 to 1985, but there are indications that the detailed business index used by Denmark's Statistics is not good enough.

Investments grew 14.6 percent last year compared with 11.0 percent the year before, and they thereby lived up to the politicians wish for strong growth in investment.

It appears differently for private consumption, however, and in retrospect it raises the question of whether the government would have gone to reducing expenditures earlier if it had had a better understanding of how much consumption rose last year. The reports of the Ministries of Economy and Finance from last fall seem to show that the civil servants did not exactly trust the figures of Denmark's Statistics, but the public politico-economic discussion would have been different if it had been clear earlier that the increase in consumption was as great as 4.3 percent.

Happy 60's

Actually one must go back to the so-called happy 60's to find over a three-year period a greater increase in the GNP and private consumption than we have had from 1983-1985. No other country in Europe has had such great success over that period.

Behind the growth in private consumption there is partly a normalization of the consumption quota (that part of disposable incomes which are used for consumption), which was pushed below its traditional level during 1979-1981, and partly a strong increase in employment.

From the fourth quarter of 1984 to the fourth quarter of 1985 the seasonal employment figure (corrected to full time) rose by 80,000 persons. Over a two-year period from the fourth quarter of 1983 the increase has been 134,000. If one looks at the latest monthly figure for unemployment, which is from February, the seasonally corrected unemployment was down to 215,000 compared with 263,000 in the same month of 1985. Thus a decline in unemployment of about 50,000 in one year.

(The new and higher production figures presumably mean that the poor productivity figures which were calculated for industry in 1985, and which have caused various pessimistic comments, will prove to be better than first assumed with renewed calculations.)

Therefore there was a boom in the Danish economy last year. The reverse of the coin was that the deficit in the balance of payments rose to 28 billion but the deficit became more understandable after the percentage growth of the gross national product was adjusted upward to 3.8 percent.

IMF WILL BE ELECTION PROBLEM FOR ANAP

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 3 Apr 86 pp 1, 8

[Article by Enis Berberoglu]

[Text] Target: Basic prices will be increased if necessary, raises will be avoided, interest rates lowered, municipalities will be given new funds for investments, civil servants will be pacified by the law on additional indices and powers.

The IMF obstacle: Short-term loan plans cause worry, lowering interest rates will fan inflation, municipal investments are too numerous.

Result: The government has taken steps to stem fund sources, economic limits have been lowered, the municipalities' March payments were not sent.

Ankara - Preparations for the "elections' economy" the government planned to implement during the spring and summer months before primaries have stumbled on the IMF. The IMF has warned that, should the government resort to election economy measures, it will criticize them in its annual evaluation report. Although this has not been confirmed yet, the political investments projected by the government with a view to the primary elections expected to take place in the fall, which will affect various sectors, are as follows: 1. Basic prices: basic prices which were disclosed gradually this year will be increased "if necessary," in other words, if the targeted inflation rate cannot be reached. As was the case last year, the totality of payments will be effected in advance.

2. Inflation and Interest Rates: It is hoped that hikes which were avoided by taking into consideration the decrease in oil prices will lead to a clear drop in the rate of inflation. In connection with this, by resorting to lowering of interest rates, it is planned to kindle the market up to a point and reassure the business sector.

3. Investments: The resources that will collect in the Fuel Stabilization Fund because of the discrepancy in oil prices between world and domestic markets, and the other resources derived from other funds and the Property Tax will be channeled toward investments through municipalities.

4. The Situation of Civil Servants: With measures that will improve the situation of civil servants, raises will in particular be given to the higher echelons of bureaucracy.

IMF Criticisms

The IMF committee which was in touch with economic elements in the capital last month, issued the following warnings with regard to the economic situation, which it viewed on the whole as positive:

1. The Problem of Domestic and Foreign Financing: It expressed worry about the emphasis on short-term plans regarding the structure of Turkey's domestic and foreign debt.
2. Interest Rates: The Fund commission pointed out that pulling down interest rates would "heat up the economy," pave the way to resorting to savings, and kindle inflation.
3. Municipal Investments: If one also takes into account last year's local authority investments, the increase in public investments reached 12.3 percent.

It was learned last week that some steps were taken toward stemming the cash flow:

"At a meeting presided over by Kaya Erdem, the decision was reached to lower somewhat economic limits, which were set but were not disclosed.

At the same meeting, the tendency emerged to make cuts in the funds transferred to municipalities from the budget and fund resources. Within this framework, the municipalities' dues for the month of March were not forwarded."

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FLEXIBLE QUOTAS NEEDED IN TEXTILES

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 3 Apr 86 p 7

[Text] Sukru Sankaya, chairman of the board of the Aksoylar Textile Industry and Trade Corporation, whose headquarters are in Bursa, said that they were in favor of more flexible quota limitations than those enforced on textile products.

The MFA (International Textile Trade Agreement), which lasted almost four years and which developed countries implemented by shelving the GATT agreement, is coming to an end in July.

While developed countries, wishing to protect their own manufacturers and fearing to lose their share in foreign markets, ask for another four-year extension of the MFA, developing countries which export wish to go back to the GATT which ensures international liberalism in trade.

The administrators of the Bursa textile firms, who unanimously agree in spite of quotas on the view that textile production must be increased and new markets be found, said the following in their evaluations of the matter:

Chairman of The Board of The Aksoylar Corporation Sukru Sankaya:

"Above all, we are in favor of maintaining more flexible quota limitations, however, just because there are quotas this does not mean we will not increase our production. As exporters, we are in the position of having to find new markets. Developed countries, in order not to lose their share in textile markets and the profits to which they were used in the past, are inclining toward quota regulations. Today, underdeveloped countries take the technology they use in their textile industry from developed countries which put quotas on their products .

Vice-Chairman of The Senis Textile Corporation Ismail Yavas:

"We believe that the MFA International trade agreement brings restrictive measures. Wider quota limits should be set. Because, just as we are ready sometimes to ship merchandise for which we have an export contract we are informed that quotas have been filled. That is why an extension of the MFA agreement for another four years would mean going through the same difficulties again.

Director General of the Sonmez ASF Spinning-Mill and Paint Industry
Corporation Mustafa Karaer:

"Since 25 September 1985 Turkey has been asking for a strict implementation of GATT regulations for the textile industry and has become a member of the "International Textile Clothing Bureau" to which 23 nations belong. This organization is working for developing nations toward liberalizing world trade. At the same time, Turkey has filed a suit with the GATT Textile Supervision Organ for the lifting of the quotas set by the MFA."

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